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ABSTRACT
In Egypt, public university hospitals play a crucial role not only in education and
research but also in the provision of healthcare services. What adds to the complexity
of public university hospitals is their existence within two sectors; higher education
and healthcare. This work highlights the inability of Egyptian public university
hospitals to achieve their tripartite mission as a result of improper institutional
governance arrangement that does not empower hospitals to cope with the
requirements of both sectors. Despite the importance of institutional governance to
university hospitals in Egypt, this topic remains under researched in the literature.
This qualitative study aims to explore the existing institutional governance
arrangement of public university hospitals in Egypt, identify key issue domains that
they face and means to overcome these challenges, and the current reforms
undertaken in public university hospitals. In-depth interviews are carried out with ten
participants covering six different public university hospitals across Egypt selected
purposively. Interviews range between 30-60 minutes each with subject-matter
experts, top leaders/ managers in public university hospitals and medical schools, and
representatives from regulatory bodies. The analysis of the study follows the
framework for public hospital governance and the owner model of university hospital
governance. Findings of this research reveal that public university hospitals follow the
unified governance arrangement. It has a number of advantages such as easier
agreement between clinical and academic enterprises, and alignment of academic
plans with clinical training. Yet, there are associated problems with the existing
governance arrangement manifested in the limited autonomy of university hospital
managers, centralization of decision making at different organizational levels,
financial mismanagement, and imbalance between academic and clinical endeavors in
certain cases. The study recommends the continuation of the unified governance
arrangement to university hospitals, yet with more autonomy to the dean, general
manager of hospitals and hospital managers. The need to develop boards of directors
professionally in terms of composition and size is crucial to the accountability of
university hospitals. Hospital managers need to be adequately empowered in
alignment with their clinical, administrative and financial responsibilities. Financially,
all revenue streams need to be consolidated electronically and linked to the missions.
|Pag e7

Chapter One: Introduction
University hospitals play a crucial role not only in education and training of young
physicians but also as healthcare providers. The main dimension that makes university
hospitals more challenging than other types of public hospitals is that they exist
within two industries; higher education and healthcare. This makes university
hospitals relatively more complex as they have to fulfill requirements of both
industries the higher education and the healthcare industries (Allison & Dalston,
1982). They have to meet both external environments and cope with the internal
environment of both the university and the hospital in addition to elements outside the
control of both the university and the hospital (ibid). University hospitals share
important characteristics and missions: every medical school must relate to a hospital
to teach its students and graduate trainees, conduct clinical research, and provide its
clinical faculty with the means of practicing their profession. The difference from one
school to the other is the structure of these interlinked relationships.
In this context, speaking about effective and sound governing structures that enable
university hospitals to fulfill their mandates is a key element for their survival and
future institutional development. In today's environment all hospitals face challenges
financial, political, operational, economic, legal etc. nationally and internationally
(Harding & Preker, 2000). Thus, it is existentially important now more than ever for
university hospitals to have effective governing structures that minimize the margin of
poor quality of decisions, empower hospitals with adequate levels of autonomy,
improve their ability to realize their potential, and to fulfill their mandate in educating
and training healthcare professionals as well as to increase the quality of services
provided to poor patients (Saltman et al., 2011).
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Therefore, recently there is heightened attention to the importance of governance in
the hospital setting. It is considered a fundamental pillar to the development of
organizations enabling them to proactively respond to constant environmental
challenges CIPE & HeGTA, 2014). Governance in its basic essence lays the
foundation for clear assignment of duties and responsibilities that result in efficient
performance and better responsiveness to stakeholder demands (ibid). Considering the
importance of governance in the hospital setting, this work explores this issue domain
in Egypt. Even though university hospitals are considered one of the performing
healthcare providers compared to other players in the healthcare sector in Egypt, there
are concerns on their institutional ability to fulfill their mandates.

1.1.

Rationale for conducting this study

Of all the potential contributing factors to the inability of public university hospitals
to achieve their tripartite mission (education & training, service provision and
research), the inadequate institutional governance arrangement is considered in this
study the fundamental factor hampering public university hospitals.
The assumption is that the existing institutional governance arrangement of public
university hospitals does not enable them to pursue their missions in the specific case
of Egypt. Governance, in this context, refers to the ways and means by which
organizations steer all their efforts for a common goal and set clear directions (OECD
& World Bank, 2010). In the university hospital setting, it is important to identify key
issue domains in how university hospitals pursue their missions. It is considered an
essential entry point towards better governed hospitals and outcomes.
Institutional governance articulates the role of governing boards, the organizational
rules and procedures, the guiding pillars for resources, the arrangement for how to
manage the performance of the executive management, and the reporting obligations
|Pag e9

(Ricci, 1999). Every organization needs effective governing structures enabling it to
fulfill its mandate and operate within the dynamic environment. "Good governance
facilitates decision making which is rational, informed and transparent, and which
leads to organizational efficiency and effectiveness. An important characteristic of
good governance is that of probity. Decision-making should ensure that varying
interests are appropriately balanced, that the reasons behind competing interests are
recognized, and that one interest is not endorsed over others on arbitrary grounds"
(Blom & Cheong, 2010). This implies that good governance practices can yield
unparalleled success in guiding decision making in a way that balances different
interests of stakeholders efficiently and effectively.
In university hospitals— being the unit of overlap between higher education and
healthcare sectors— their governance arrangement is even more complex than other
publicly-owned healthcare providers. In accordance, the understanding of the
authority and function distribution among the different actors and their larger
institutional affiliations as well as the modes of control is a key governance
consideration that helps analyze the ability of the university hospitals to reach its
objectives (Ricci, 1999).
In alignment with Ricci's proposition of governance, the following definition explains
the multiple dimensions of the organization that governance processes have to deal
with. "Governance processes deal with multiple dimensions of an institution: how it
coheres; how its exercises authority; how it relates to internal members (students and
staff); how it relates to external stakeholders (government, business, local community,
international institutions); how it makes decisions; and how and how far it delegates
responsibility for decisions and actions internally" (Blom & Cheong, 2010, p.12).
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Seeing that the inappropriate governance structure of university hospitals as one of the
fundamental factors hampering hospitals to achieve their tripartite mission leads to the
following theoretical considerations: How are university hospitals currently governed
in Egypt and in what way is the existing governing structure enabling them to fulfill
their mandates? Despite the importance of institutional governance in the university
hospitals setting, limited evidence-based research is found on the case of Egypt.
The significance of this study steams from attempting to answer how university
hospitals are governed in Egypt and to what extent does the existing governance
arrangement enable the hospitals to achieve their missions. It sheds light on
institutional governance of public university hospitals because this type of hospitals is
a strategic provider of services in Egypt and a destination for a large segment of
patients. Conceptualizing the existing governance arrangement helps in understanding
the nature of this arrangement, the potential drawbacks, and in coming up with
recommendations to capitalize on strength points of the system.

1.2.

Research objectives

This research provides a description of the governance arrangement of public
university hospitals in Egypt. It takes university hospitals as the unit of analysis and
examines the governance arrangement from an institutional paradigm. The study's
objectives are to:
-

Analyze the current institutional governance of publicly-owned university
hospitals

-

Highlight the potential challenges that university hospitals face given the
current institutional governance structure

-

Articulate the reforms directed to university hospitals
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Based on the results of the analysis, possible recommendations can be inferred to
improve the performance of university hospitals to achieve their tripartite missions.

1.3.

Background

1.3.1.

Overview on higher education system governance in Egypt

The Egyptian higher education system is characterized by high centralization where
significant authority is in the hands of the Egyptian President where he/she appoints
the university presidents of public universities (OECD & World Bank, 2010).
Similarly, the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) has control over all higher
education venues. The Ministry supervises and coordinates all postsecondary
education, planning, policy formulation and quality control (ibid; El Said, 2014). The
only public higher education institution outside the jurisdiction of the MOHE is AlAzhar University (OECD & World Bank, 2010). It is the responsibility of the Central
Administration of Al-Azhar Institutes, which is a department of the Supreme Council
of Al-Azhar (ibid).
For public universities, the main regulatory body is the Supreme Council for
Universities (SCU) (OECD & World Bank, 2010; El Said, 2014). It coordinates the
work of the different public universities across Egypt and is chaired by the Minister of
Higher Education in his occupational capacity (OECD & World Bank, 2010).
According to governing law of universities no. 49/1972, SCU is mandated to set
policies to all universities, academic education, and scientific research work in
universities.
1.3.2.

Overview on healthcare service providers in Egypt

The Egyptian healthcare sector is characterized by being a pluralistic system, with a
wide number of public and private providers. There are different public entities
involved in service delivery which include: the Ministry of Health (MOH), MOHE,
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and other ministries' hospitals (such as the Ministry of Aviation, Ministry of Defense,
and Ministry of Interiors etc.) (DHS, 2014). In the Egyptian context, MOH is the main
provider of primary, preventive and curative care through its healthcare facilities,
while other public providers contribute with secondary and tertiary healthcare services
(ibid). In addition to the service provision role, the MOH is also responsible for the
overall health policy on a national level and for the regulation of the healthcare sector
at large in terms of finance, private and public service provision, pharmaceutical
sector etc.(ibid).
There are also semi-governmental organizations that are involved in service delivery.
These organizations are considered governmental establishments operated through a
government representation like the MOH or other ministries. These include: Health
Insurance Organization (HIO), the General Organization for Teaching Hospitals and
Institutes (GOTHI), the Curative Care Organization (CCO) in addition to other hybrid
forms of public providers (DHS, 2014).
Publicly-owned university hospitals operate under the authority of MOHE. In total,
there are 17 faculties of medicine across Egypt each with affiliate university hospitals
(Supreme council of Universities, 2017). The total number of university hospitals is
around 106 hospitals with the mandate of education and training, scientific research,
and treatment (Ahl Masr News, 2016). According to the same DHS Report (2014),
university hospitals are classified as secondary and tertiary care facilities. In
comparison to

MOH facilities,

university hospitals are considered

more

technologically advanced and with a sophisticated medical expertise (ibid). Cairo
University Hospitals, among other university hospitals, are the largest in size
encompassing more than 5,000 beds and the oldest in history (ibid).
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The following figure is a demonstrative overview of public healthcare providers in
Egypt.

Source: Author constructed based on the DSH Report (2014)
1.3.3.

Overview on public administration reform in Egypt

Currently in Egypt, the Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform
(MOPMAR) launched a national strategy for administrative reform in 2015. It
envisions the public administrative system to be efficient, effective, transparent, fair
and responsive (MOPMAR, 2015). The government seeks to establish the public
administrative system in a way that provides quality services to citizens and ensures
accountability of actors (ibid). The objective of the reform plan is to face the negative
repercussions of administrative bureaucracy through simplifying the organizational
structures of complex public institutions and enhancing human skills for better
performance and introducing e-government methods (Social Research Center, 2017).
The administrative reform strategy comes in alignment with the national vision of
Egypt "Vision 2030" that has a pillar on efficient and transparent government
institutions (MOPMAR, 2015). Egypt's Vision 2030 indicates the transformation of
public government institutions to "an efficient and effective public administration
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sector managing State resources with transparency, fairness, and flexibility. Subject to
accountability, maximizing citizen satisfaction, and responding to their needs" (ibid,
p.126). This vision is further elaborated into specific objectives of: (1) increasing the
efficiency of the state’s financial, material, and human resources, (2) offering the
necessary public services needed by citizens in an efficient manner, (3) improve the
services needed by the public enterprise in order to bring more investments, and
finally, (4) achieving the interaction between the government, society and its
institutions through a comprehensive governance system (ibid). Public university
hospitals are of no exception to other public institutions in Egypt which need
enhancement of their efficiency in their financial, material and human resources. This
means that these national reforms implicitly apply to public university hospitals as
well.
1.3.4.

University hospitals in Egypt: The overlap between the healthcare and the
higher education sectors

Public university hospitals are part of two industries: the healthcare and the higher
education sectors. Being under the university umbrella implies a strong educational
and training dimension, and being a hospital implies a strong service delivery
component (Allison & Dalston, 1982). This is why university hospitals are relatively
more complex than other types of public hospitals because they have to meet the
requirements and regulations of both sectors while maintaining a balance between
them.
University hospitals are widely popular in the Egyptian context and are the number
one destination to many patients across Egypt because of the perception that the
presence of academic staff within the premises of the hospital guarantees better
healthcare to patients (DHS, 2014). Thus, the role of university hospitals is not only
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confined to offering medical education and training to young physicians but also has a
strategic importance to the delivery of medical health services. The great demand for
clinical services from university hospital needs to be understood within the health and
economic status. In a country like Egypt with the majority of its population coming
from low- and middle-income economic strata, makes the presence of big hospitals,
such as these of university hospitals, strategically pivotal for public service delivery.
The increasing demand for healthcare services from university hospitals puts a lot of
pressure on them while other publicly-owned hospitals fail to keep up with the
demand, despite the constant efforts to do so.
1.3.5.

Organizational arrangement of university hospitals in Egypt

Being affiliated to universities, university hospitals follow Law no. 49/1972 in
reference to the organization of the work of universities.

From an institutional

perspective, university hospitals are affiliated to the Ministry of Higher Education.
The oversight function of the Ministry of Higher Education over the work of
university hospitals is not as authoritative as that of the Ministry of Health over its
hospitals (Supreme Council of Universities, 2017). The Supreme Council of
Universities is the central body that regulates the work of universities across Egypt.
The president of the Supreme Council is the Minister of Higher Education, according
to the law no. 49/ 1972. Particularly for the work of university hospitals, Presidential
Decree no.3300/1965 is the main decree that articulates the mandates of public
university hospitals.
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1.4.

Research questions

In light of the strategic importance of university hospitals and their role in Egypt, the
aim of this work is to explore the governance arrangement of university hospitals, the
nature of current and ongoing reforms in the hospital setting, the main challenges that
university hospitals face and means to overcome them. The main unit of analysis of
this study is public university hospitals in Egypt.
This study attempts to give answers to the following questions:
How are university hospitals governed in Egypt?
-

The question aims at exploring how university hospitals are governed which
directly reflects on their fulfillment to the mandates and organizational
objectives. It attempts to find answers to how the existing governance
structure of university hospitals helps them operate or rather hampers them.

What are the main challenges facing university hospitals?
-

The question aims at highlighting the main hurdles that university hospitals
face in undertaking their mandates. It attempts to give a list of the main
problems facing senior and top leadership at university hospitals.

What is the nature of current reforms that are undertaken in the university
hospitals setting in Egypt?
-

This question aims at exploring the different reform attempts, their scope and
the main organizational dimensions they targeted. Answering this question
will lay down an understanding of the most common clusters of reform that
healthcare leaderships advocate for and support.
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In light of current reforms and existing challenges, how to improve the
institutional governance arrangement of public university hospitals?
-

The question attempts to shed light on potential adjustments in the governance
of public hospitals in light of the challenges that the hospital leadership faces.
It aims at exploring potential areas of improvement on how to overcome the
identified key challenges.

1.5.

Structure of the paper

The paper is divided into six chapters covering the following domains:
Chapter one introduces the topic, the rationale for conducting this work and the
research objectives. A glimpse on the status of university hospitals in Egypt is briefly
discussed. It describes the two sectors (healthcare and higher education) that overlap
at the university hospital unit. At the end of the chapter the research questions are
presented and explained.
Chapter two offers a detailed review of the literature with respect to conceptualizing
university hospitals, identifying different institutional governance arrangements, and
identifying accountability and autonomy setups.
Chapter three presents the different theoretical concepts that guide the understanding
in the study and how they are applied to the arrangement of university hospitals in
Egypt
Chapter four describes the research methodology conducted in the research. The
chapter gives details about the research design, the overall research strategy, the
sample selection, data collection and data analysis technique. Ethical considerations
are elaborated and finally limitations and delimitations of the study are discussed.
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Chapter five presents a thorough analysis of primary data collected is conducted in
alignment with the review of secondary data. Findings of the analysis are articulated
in this chapter as well.
Chapter six concludes the main threads that came across the study and offers some
recommendations based on the weak points demonstrated in the analysis.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
The governance of university hospitals is mostly accompanied with the question of
what is the most suitable model and the governance considerations that guide the
tripartite mission of university hospitals. The focus of this work is on conceptualizing
publicly-owned university hospitals within the wider literature. The review is
organized in three main thematic categories.
First thematic category refers to conceptualizing the term university hospitals. It
covers a range of definitions to the term university hospitals, the conceptual
differences between academic health centers and university hospital and highlights the
balance created between the different missions.
Second thematic category tackles the notion of (institutional) governance in the
hospital setting. Governance under this thematic category is understood in the hospital
setting as the unit of analysis scoping out macro and micro level governance. The
section covers main theoretical definitions of hospital governance and the main
commonalities drawn from the range of definitions. It also covers a detailed portrayal
of the different university hospital governance models. The thematic category also
sheds light on the need for autonomy and accountability of public hospitals. For each
of these subsections detailed review is conducted.
Third thematic category highlights the different attempts for reform in public
hospitals and the reasons for carrying out the reform. Conclusions from the review of
literature are drawn and the potential theoretical gap in this issue domain is
highlighted at the final section of this chapter.
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2.1.

Conceptualizing university hospitals

This thematic category in the literature highlights the different definitions of
university hospitals and positions them within the wider category of academic health
centers.
2.1.1.
2.1.1.1.

Defining University Hospitals
Academic Health Centers and University Hospitals

University hospitals are considered a typical form of clinical enterprise that is
affiliated to a university. The combination of both the medical school and a hospital
(university-based) is referred to as an Academic Health Center (AHC) (Association of
American Medical Colleges, 1997). AHCs are defined in reference to their
organizational components which commonly include the medical school, potentially
other health professions school like nursing and pharmacy, and what is commonly
referred to as a clinical enterprise in the form of a hospital or other clinical outlets
(ibid). Similarly, the Association of Academic Health Centers definition also
highlights the same organizational components which include the medical school,
other health professions and an affiliate or owned hospital (Institute of Medicine,
Committee on the Roles of Academic Health Centers in the 21 st Century, 2004). In
alignment with this definition, the Commonwealth Task Force on Academic Health
Centers defines AHC also in relation to a medical school and an affiliate clinical
facility; which might not necessarily be in a hospital form (ibid).
Although there is no widely communicated and accepted definition, there are common
organizational elements that most of the definitions entail. These elements include the
affiliation to a medical school which entails an academic dimension and the existence
of a clinical dimension commonly in the institutional form of a hospital. "The core of
the AHC constellation is its academic or university-related roles in education and
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research, which, in combination with patient care, are ultimately aimed at improving
the health of people." (Institute of Medicine, Committee on the Roles of Academic
Health Centers in the 21 st Century, 2004, p.20). The relationship between the clinical
and the academic functions, in this context, can be through different arrangements, for
instance, through common ownership under a university umbrella other potential
areas.
2.1.1.2.

Focus on University Hospitals

The following are some conceptualizations with a special focus on the clinical
enterprise manifested in the form of university hospitals. According to Collins English
Dictionary, university hospitals are referred to as "a hospital that is affiliated with a
university. University hospitals provide clinical education and training to future and
current doctors, nurses and other health professionals, in addition to delivering
medical care to patients."
The definition highlights two main dimensions that characterize the nature of
university hospitals. First, the provision of clinical education and training to
healthcare professionals including doctors and nurses is an essential dimension of
university hospitals. Education and training are considered the heart of their work. In
addition, providing healthcare services and medical treatment is another mission of
university hospitals. However, the great research interest of university hospitals is not
accentuated in this definition.
The Association of UK University Hospitals adds to the Collins Dictionary definition
the great research interest that university hospitals entail. It depicts the three major
interests that combined the core functions of university hospitals; namely teaching
&training, academic research and medical service provision to patients (Association
of UK University Hospitals, 2012). It is argued that intensive academic research,
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education and service delivery together form a circle where each dimension feeds into
the other. The diagram by the Association of UK University Hospitals shows the
cyclical relationship between the three mission centers of university hospitals.

(Association of UK University Hospitals, 2012, p.1)
The diagram depicts the key elements that make university hospitals unique compared
to other types of hospitals. It is committed to developing new healthcare professionals
and to apply scientific breakthroughs. Research engaged staff and education focused
professions deliver together leading healthcare services to patients. University
hospitals can also be characterized and defined not only by the functions that they
carry out but also according to the different levels of hospitals.
According to Hensher et al. (2006, p.1230), university hospitals are defined as
"tertiary-level hospital with highly specialized staff and technical equipment— for
example, cardiology, intensive care unit and specialized imaging units; clinical
services highly differentiated by function; could have teaching activities; size ranges
from 300 to 1,500 beds." In this classification, university hospitals are seen as referral
hospitals from primary and secondary levels of hospitals. They encompass highly
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specialized medical team and sophisticated technical equipment offering services to
patients and carrying out teaching activities.
Being equally responsible for the three aforementioned missions, scholars accentuate
the necessity to balance between these missions. Steering the totality of the hospital
with the three missions equally is an important dimension of successful university
hospitals. This balance can be reflected in terms of hospital leadership selection and in
resource allocation and financial support. For example, Wietecha et al. (2009), argue
that in recognition to the different natures of academic and clinical functions, the
selection of leadership needs to reflect needs to be based on a combination of both
academic as well as hospital executive management competence. The balanced
competence of leadership leads to better integration of both functions within the
hospital and is more probable to lead to success of the interconnected missions (ibid).
The leadership selection can also influence decisions related to resource allocation
and financial decisions for both academic and clinical functions. In cases where the
leadership is purely from an academic background, clinical functions can be
overlooked. In terms of resource allocation, the same can happen where clinical
functions are not adequately supported as academic functions and vice versa (ibid;
Barrett, 2008). This strategic imbalance can lead to negative repercussions on the
overall performance of the hospitals which encompasses both the academic and the
clinical functions.

2.2.

Governance of public hospitals

This thematic category discusses varies definitions of hospital governance, the different
model of governance to university hospitals, and the autonomy and accountability of public
hospitals. It draws on literature not only from the healthcare sector but also from the higher
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education sector, as public university hospitals are an area of intersection between both
sectors.
2.2.1.

Definitions

The focus of this section is on defining governance in the hospital setting. As most of
the social constructs, there is no agreed upon definition of hospital governance despite
some commonalities across all definitions. However, because university hospitals are
part of the higher education sector, literature in reference to governance of higher
education institutions is visited as well as from the healthcare sector.
Early discussions of the term hospital governance took place when decision makers
synchronized better performance of healthcare organizations with proper and enabling
organizational arrangement in the European context (Saltman et al., 2011). However,
because hospital governance was viewed as an element of hospital performance
decision makers started using the term interchangeably with hospital management
(ibid). One of the reasons for the interchangeable use of the terms is the lack of an
equivalent term for "governance" in European languages (Mossialos et al., 2010).
This is why the conceptualization of the term hospital governance was complicated.
Saltman et al. (2011) underscores this idea by stating that:
"The term governance, like other, similar English language terms relating to
directing policy (e.g. stewardship and accountability), does not easily translate
into some European languages, so that the concept of governance itself may
have different meanings in different national contexts" (Saltman et al., 2011,
p. 4).
In accordance, Saltman et al. (2011) put hospital governance as the overarching
notion specifying the different key relationships between actors and their decisionmaking. He defines hospital governance as:
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"As set of processes and tools related to decision-making in steering the
totality of institutional activity, influencing most major aspects of
organizational behavior and recognizing the complex relationships between
different stakeholders. Its scope ranges from normative values (equity, ethics)
to access, quality, patient responsiveness and patient safety dimensions. It also
incorporates political, financial, managerial as well as daily operational issues"
(Saltman et al., 2011, p.38).
The definition stresses fundamentally on the processes and tools of decision-making
in the hospital premises. These decisions are designed to steer the entire organization,
influence organizational behavior and acknowledge the stakeholder environment.
From the author's point of view, governance involves normative values such as equity
and ethics as well as access, quality, patient responsiveness and patient safety
dimensions. In alignment with his conceptualization of the hospital governance,
Saltman proposes a framework assessing governance in the public hospital setting. In
his framework, hospital governance is a mean to achieve autonomy of decisionmaking in hospitals. The framework blends strategic governance dimensions
influenced by macro-level arrangements and with operational governance on the
micro-level arrangement (hospital setting).
The strategic governance dimensions are usually decided by the government and the
operational governance relates to the hospital's ability to translate broad decisions to
implementation on an operational level (Saltman et al., 2011; Duran, 2011).
According to the framework by Saltman (2011), strategic governance dimensions
relate to institutional dimension, financial dimension and accountability dimension.
The operational governance refers to the correspondence between responsibility and
decision-making capacity at the hospital level (ibid).
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Saltman and Duran both have leading work on hospital governance. They agree that
hospital autonomy is the mean towards public hospitals that are capable to honor their
promises and are able to translate the macro level decisions on the hospital unit. Their
work stresses on publicly-owned hospitals in general without specifying the different
public ownership types. Thus, university hospitals are a special type of public
ownership where they belong to both industries the healthcare sector as well as to the
higher education sector.
Stressing on the distribution of authority, Ricci (1999) defines governance as "the
distribution of authority and functions among the units within a larger entity, the
modes of communication and control among them and the conduct of relationships
between the entity and the surrounding environment.‖ It stresses on how organizations
set their directions and the ways they use to organize their efforts towards a common
purpose.
Derived from the higher education sector, governance deals with multiple dimensions
of the institution. It relates to the exercise of authority, internal and external
stakeholders, how decisions are taken within the organization and how does
delegation of responsibilities take place within the organization (OECD, 2010).
Moreover, governance arrangements have structures through which decisions are
taken and implemented. "The structure of governance includes the role of institutional
governing boards and presidents, their participative structures, their procedural rules
and sanctions, their policies for resource allocation and their arrangements for
performance management, monitoring and reporting" (ibid, p.84). The statement
highlights some important elements that need to be included in any governance
structure which includes the existence of a governing board and president that sets
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standards for resource allocation, performance management for the executive team as
well as policies for monitoring and reporting obligations.
Assuring the proper structuring of governance within organizations implies smoother,
rational, informed and transparent decision-making which results in organizational
efficiencies and effectiveness (OECD & World Bank, 2010). "Decision-making
should ensure that varying interests are appropriately balanced, that the reasons
behind competing interests are recognized and that one interest is not endorsed over
others on arbitrary grounds" (Blom & Cheong, 2010). Good governance has the
characteristic of ensuring the balance between the conflicting interests of important
stakeholders.
From the broad range of definitions we can infer that the term hospital governance is
considered to be conceptually and practically a complicated construct to define. There
is limited consensus around the common elements that best define the term and its
multidimensional nature. Thus, we find authors who define hospital governance from
a structural point of view, while others focus on the process dimension of governance
and other look for linguistic synonyms.
Structure-oriented definitions introduce hospital governance through distinctive
institutional arrangements and structural alignments of public hospitals description.
There are other definitions that are process-oriented focusing on the different levels of
hospital-related decision-making. These decisions include both strategic as well as
operational decision-making activities. Others refer to the term 'governance', in the
language of Osborne and Gabler (1993), as steering rather than rowing in the sense of
giving directions and orientation.

| P a g e 28

2.2.2.

University Hospital Governance Models

Literature focuses on how best to organize the relationship between the three different
actors; university, medical school and the hospital. In this respect, governance shapes
the relations of executive management and the fiduciary or advisory roles.
2.2.2.1.

Conceptualizing Relationship between the Parent-University, Medical School
and Hospital

Organizing the relationship between the three main actors in the governance of
university hospitals is a key determinant of the structure of the governing model. In
the literature, there is a clear trend towards the separation of the hospital from the
control of the university giving different reasons for that.
Some authors believe that the separation between the university and the teaching
hospital will enable hospitals to be more market-oriented, competitive in decisionmaking and flexible in decision-making (Allison & Dalston, 1982; Detmer & Steen,
2000; Schimpff & Rapoport, 1997).
However, other scholarly writers believe that there is no conclusive evidence about
the most appropriate relationship between the three actors. They argue that whether
the university and the hospital are under one umbrella or under separate institutional
affiliations each has its successes and failures (Wietcher et al., 2009; Weiner et al,
2001; Duderstadt; 2000; Barrett, 2008).
Authors in support of the separation between the university and the hospitals argue
that, university hospitals cannot be more market-oriented as long as they are
controlled by university boards in which their relation to their hospitals is only for
evaluation or accountability (Allison & Dalston, 1982). Consequently, the tripartite
mission of hospitals; patient care, teaching and research is further divided. The dean
would be responsible only for the academic matters reflected in research and
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education, whereas the hospital director would be responsible only for patient services
(Ibid).
In alignment with the idea of separating structures, authors Detmer and Steen (2000)
argue that reducing the role of the parent university will automatically result in
improved decision-making in terms of flexibility and speed. Schimpff and Rapoport
(1997) take a similar stance, yet, advocate for a more 'aggressive' approach. They
suggest that university hospitals may be best served by: removing them from
university governance allowing them to give primacy to their mission of patient care.
Moreover, removing hospitals from state ownership allows them to use sound
business practices in the competitive healthcare environment (Ibid).
These views can be critiqued for a number of reasons. First, under the separate
arrangement for university and their hospitals, there is a threat on the ability of
university hospitals to still support educational and training purposes, which in fact
distinguishes them from other types of public hospitals (Duderstadt, 2000). Moreover,
reaching an agreement between the hospital leadership and the medical school
leadership, under a separate arrangement, results in potential conflicts and disputes
where each leader legitimately seeks its own organizational interest (Wietecha et al.,
2009). This consequently results in more time spent on negotiations to align the
visions of both leaderships. In the words of Barrett (2008), there are two main reasons
for the integration of the university with the hospital; strategic focus and financial
discipline. Strategic focus aligns efforts and interests towards shared goals of both
actors, which creates a better work environment (ibid).
For the financial discipline, Barrett argues that academic missions can be advanced
through the revenue generated by the clinical practices to support research and
educational trainings (ibid). This consequently leads to what Wietecha et al. (2009)
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refer to as 'overall peace on campus'. In alignment with Barrett's proposition, Weiner
et al. (2001) suggest that under one umbrella of the university all research, education
and patient treatment are all met from within the organization without seeking them
from outside.
2.2.2.2.

Organizational Arrangements of University Hospitals

Unlike other publicly-owned hospitals, university hospitals have a special institutional
affiliation between the university, the faculty of medicine and the hospital. The
governing structure of this type of hospitals has to reflect the triangular relationship as
well as enable the organization to realize its tripartite mission.
The literature addressing governing structures of university hospitals describe mainly
two types; separate and unified governance. The separate governance format is based
on what Wietcha et.al. (2009, p.170) describe as the "multiple fiduciary, multiple
executive leader" which entails that the teaching hospitals and the universities each
have their own fiduciary boards and executive management (ibid). There is a
combination of organizational arrangements classified under the multiple governance
structure that is expanded in the works of the writers Weiner et. al. (2001) and
Cullbertson (1996) in attempts to answer the question of the potential organizational
models for governing and managing medical school relations with the faculty practice
plans and affiliated clinical delivery organizations. The main arms of the suggested
organizational arrangements are between the school of medicine and what both writers
refer to as clinical enterprise (which includes a collective reference to the clinical
providers, delivery organizations).
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(Wietecha et. al., 2009, p.171)
The figure above is extracted from the work of Wietcha et. al. (2009) on the multiple
governance models of university hospitals. It is also known as the unlinked model of
governance. The multiple model puts together the two independent, yet, interrelated
boards; the University Board and the Hospital/System Board. Both boards reach
agreements together to advance the mission of the hospital in alignment with the
academic functions of the university. The University Board with the president or
chancellor on top is followed by the provost/ executive vice president/ vice chancellor
and followed by the school of medicine where the dean heads it. On the other side, the
hospital/system board is followed by the System CEO and followed by the teaching
hospital headed by the CEO. In this model, the executive arms under the university
board and the hospital/system board reports separately to their respective boards. In
accordance, the accountability of clinical and academic functions is the responsibility
of the respective boards.
In alignment with the conceptualization of Wietecha et. al. to the multiple model of
governance, the works of Weiner et. al. (2001) and Cullbertson (1996) put together a
typology with a number of possible organizational arrangements within the multiple
governance structure; which includes alliance leader model and community leader
model along other variations of these organizational models.
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The alliance leader organizational arrangement implies a moderate/partial integration
between the academic and the clinical functions. Under this model, the medical school
organizes the clinical activity of its faculty and interfaces with other components of
the organized delivery system through tightly linked contracts rather than through
equity or legal ownership. The dean or equivalent possesses modest authority in the
governance and management of the clinical enterprise. However, both functions have
a strong institutional linkage where the financial sustainability of one depends on the
other function's sustainability (ibid).
In the community leader model, the school of medicine and the teaching hospital are
not under common ownership and with separate legal identities. To advance its
mission, the school of medicine relies on existing hospitals, not necessarily owned by
the university, which creates fragmentation in the realization of clinical practices. The
relationship is bound by contracts of limited scope and duration. However, to
guarantee having a say in the clinical practice, in some cases the dean or equivalent
serves on the board of hospitals to influence clinical practices in favor of academic
dimensions. In addition, because the dean or equivalent has authority to appoint
academic department chairs, he/she links clinical practice to academic plans. Plus, this
person can play a consultative role in the selection of clinical partner organizations'
CEOs.
The other discussed governance orientation in the literature is the unified governance
format. It is based on "single fiduciary and one executive leader" where hospital,
faculty, education and research endeavors are all under one overarching framework
(Wietecha et. al., 2009).
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(Wietcha et. al., 2009, p.171).
The single model puts the University Board headed by the president/chancellor at the
focal point of both clinical and academic functions. The University Board is followed
by the provost/executive vice president/vice chancellor, similar to the multiple model.
This is followed by, on the one hand, the school of medicine headed by the dean and
on the other hand, the teaching hospital headed by the system CEO and the hospital
CEO. Both of the medical school and the teaching hospital should reach an agreement
together on the conducted activities. The executive arms of the school and the hospital
are unified at the University Board level. The accountability for both clinical and
academic practices is at a single person who is responsible to the university president
or board to all aspects. Similarly, Weiner et. al. (2001) refers to the single model as
the owner model. It is a common ownership structure—typically a university or
medical school parent holding structure—presides over the medical school, the
faculty practice plan and the clinical function.
The owner model operates as a closed system in which the elements of system
finance, hospital and institutional services, professional services and medical
education are delivered under a single governance and administrative structure. Much
of the academic and clinical enterprises' capital, research, and teaching needs are met
internally—that is, they are ―made‖ within the system rather than ―bought‖ from other
organizations (ibid; Barrett, 2008). Academic control is high in this model, with the
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dean or equivalent possesses unified authority over the academic and clinical
enterprises. He/she holds the traditional responsibilities of a dean or vice president for
the academic mission and also exercises executive authority over the business
operations of the organized delivery system" (ibid).
Similar to the owner model, the subsidiary model integrates both clinical and
academic functions under the umbrella of the university, yet, with limited academic
authority over the clinical practices (Weiner et al., 2001). "As a subsidiary
organization, the medical school exercises relatively little power in the governance
and management of the clinical enterprise." (ibid, p.118). The interdependence
between the two actors is considered under this organizational arrangement
asymmetrical as academic leadership does not have the authority to allocate financial
resources between the academic and the clinical functions. It is rather the case that the
medical school has a predetermined budget negotiated and allocated by the university
for all operating units. Even in the appointments of academic department chairs and
clinical leadership, the dean is only consulted but the final decision remains in the
authority of the university (ibid).
The literature shows that both models do not give a clear answer to the question of
how best to organize the relationships between the three main players. Both models
do not ensure the balance between both functions of university hospitals; the clinical
and the academic functions. Also both models have their drawbacks which drive
organizations to move towards the other type of governance. Different organizational
natures dictate the applicability of one model over the other.
The most cited drawback of the multiple model is that it gives space for
confrontations and conflict in governing university hospitals because of differing
primary missions (Weiner et.al, 2001; Barrett, 2008). Thus, the collaboration of the
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two leaderships, where on the one hand, the academic front is responsible to ensure
the funds flow within academic enterprise and on the other hand the clinical front is
responsible to safeguard the patients and make sure that the funds are allocated to the
treatment of patients, is a challenging task (Wietecha et. al. 2009; Kastor, 2004;
Cullbertson et. al., 1996).
Although the single model of governance reduces the number of conflicts and offers a
unified point of accountability and vision, "the university-governed clinical practices
are viewed as financial liabilities to the extent that they negatively affect the
university credit ratings" (Wietecha et al., 2009, p.171). It is argued that the clinical
functions under the single governance model are under the umbrella of the university,
which tends to weaken it because of the lacking competence to run the hospital in the
competitive healthcare environment (ibid; Schimpff & Rapoport, 1997; Allison &
Dalston, 1982). Moreover, Culbertson et al. (1996) observe that the capital
requirements and financial risks associated with the single model design make it an
unwanted governing structure to a number of medical schools. Moreover, under this
type of governance model, the academic enterprise bears substantial financial risk for
the performance of the clinical enterprise (Weiner et al., 2001).
2.2.2.3.

Key Governance Considerations to Guide University Hospitals

Irrespective of the organizational arrangements that govern the relations between the
academic and the clinical functions, scholarly writers give a number of key
considerations for successful governance of university hospitals. From a study
conducted on the governance practices in US academic medical centers, the study
suggests three wide governance guidelines: appropriate education and personal
development of board members, using hospital performance measures that guide
quality and setting systematic board self-assessment processes (Szekendi et. al.,
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2014). Wietcha et. al. (2009) suggest governing behavior for university hospitals that
strikes a balance between the academic and the clinical functions. These behavioral
considerations include:


Balancing criteria in the selection of executive leadership

In the selection of the executive leadership, potential candidates have to exhibit
significant abilities in both academic as well as clinical fronts. He/she must be able to
balance and prioritize between the different missions that might at certain times
conflict.


Aligning the boards' mission and performance in defining successful
stewardship

Boards of trustees'/ directors' composition have to encompass sufficient expertise and
diversity of members. They have to allocate sufficient time and make proper
judgments for the survival of the organization. The board in this case represents the
fiduciary interests of clinical and academic functions. As a steward, the board should
not show any favoritism in resource allocation for one mission at the expense of the
other.


Articulating the board of trustees' fiduciary responsibility for the collective
outcomes of hospitals

Boards have the responsibility to assure long term financial sustainability of academic
and clinical practices. The fiduciary duty of boards dictates on its members to work in
the best interest of both interrelated functions. The academic function is dominantly
led by advancements in knowledge generation and training that ultimately supports
patient treatment. The clinical function is led by the patient care that is backed up by
academic advancements.

| P a g e 37

This is valid for boards within the single model of governance where assuring long
term financial sustainability of the clinical and academic functions requires the board
to have an overall picture of the revenue allocation to both and the allocation of funds
to the accomplishment of the respective missions. This indicates that the funds that
flow in between the two functions has to be visible to them.
2.2.3.

Autonomy of Decision-making in Hospitals

The proposition of many scholarly writers about governance and autonomy is that
good governance practices are the way forward for autonomous hospitals (Saltman et
al., 2011; Duran, 2011; Bogue et al., 2007; Neave & van Vught, 1994).
Thus, this section focuses on understanding autonomy in the hospital setting with a
special focus on literature on public hospitals as well as on higher education
institutions.
From the perspective of public hospitals, autonomy is considered a key element of
efficient and effective clinical outcomes of hospitals as several academic analyses
suggest (Saltman et al., 2011). Bogue et al., (2007, p. 3) argue that "Freeing hospitals
from institutional and governmental control, referred to as facility-based management,
seems to be associated with better hospital performance. The values underlying
facility independence, however, must exist simultaneously with other socially or
politically defined priorities and accountabilities. Commitment to pursue higherperforming governance models will be possible only through thoughtful examination
of the internal and external contexts that shape hospital behaviors, including market
strategies, regulations, local definitions of autonomy and the scope and distribution of
stakeholder incentives." The author, however, takes the argument beyond autonomy
more towards independence from institutional affiliations and government control. He
argues that adopting a 'facility-based management' approach would result in better
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hospital performance (ibid). Unlike the complete independence presented by Bogue et
al., Duran (2011) does not argue for complete independence but rather for semiautonomous hospitals that restrict the interference of local and regional political
actors in decision-making. Along the same lines of the argument, Allison and Dalston
(1982) argue that the more controlling the boards are, the less efficient the hospital
outcomes. The argument of the authors in this sense indicates that hospital autonomy
is dependent on the type of relationship the hospital has to its board rather than from
local and regional political actors' interference. They argue that hospital autonomy in
this case would enhance the responsiveness of the hospitals to market dynamics
(ibid). There is a clear positioning in the literature about hospital autonomy that
supports semi-independence of the hospital from direct hospital affiliations. Authors
support hospital autonomy through hospital governance as they see governance as the
pathway to more autonomy for public hospitals.
Looking at autonomy from the higher education perspective, there are a number of
commonalities with the application of autonomy in the healthcare sector. The authors
Neave and van Vught (1994) design the interfering relationship of the government
with higher education organizations along a continuum. The continuum portrays the
degree of government control at one end to the degree of government supervision at
the other end (ibid). In the language of New Public Management (NPM), it is the
governments' shift from "rowing" to "steering", or from "intervening" to
"influencing". This shift in the role of the state is mirrored on regulations as well,
where the authors argue that the state's role will shift from micro-regulation to metaregulations (ibid). The shift in the state's role is considered an essential step given the
contemporary setting of the higher education system. In alignment with the
proposition of Neave and van Vught, Fielden (2008) suggests that by giving higher
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education institutions more autonomy allows their management to cater better for
their institutional needs and to better exercise their legitimate academic freedoms. The
author explains that "the management of very complex academic communities cannot
be done effectively by remote civil servants and the task should be left to institutions
themselves. The constraints of centrally managing a system that needs to be flexible
and responsive have become clear" (ibid, p.85). He accentuates the constraints that
centrally managed systems by remote civil servants are great hampering factors to the
flexibility institutions need for better responsiveness.
Agreeing on the importance of autonomy for institutions to better serve their
organizational purposes, Berdahl (1990) provides a useful typology between two
categories of autonomy; "substantive" and "procedural" (also named operational) in
the higher education setting. According to Berdahl (1990), substantive autonomy
refers to the authority that institutions have to determine their academic plans and
research policies in alignment with their priorities. The core principle underpinning
substantial autonomy lies in safeguarding academic integrity and freedom. This
freedom includes what and how to teach, whom to admit as students, whom to employ
and promote in academic staffing appointments (ibid). Procedural autonomy means
operational freedom of institutions to administer their non-academic affairs.
"Procedural autonomy refers to the authority of institutions in essentially nonacademic areas such as revenue raising and expenditure management, non-academic
staff appointments, purchasing and entering into contracts"(ibid, p. 172). In alignment
with the autonomy typology, the Government of India (2005) adds that procedural
autonomy includes freedom over the management of financial affairs where the
institution is free to allocate resources freely to support their organizational priorities.
It is arguable that procedural autonomy proceeds substantive autonomy. Given
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institutions some autonomy to manage their administrative and financial affairs can be
a step towards more autonomy in setting overarching policies in the academic realm.
In support to the crucial need for procedural as well as substantial autonomy, "when
institutions have more discretion over the mobilization of their resources, including
personnel, they have greater flexibility to adjust their educational offerings to
changing circumstances" (OECD & World Bank, 2010).
2.2.4.
2.2.4.1.

Accountability of Hospitals
Defining Accountability

In an environment where autonomous hospitals are created to take their own
decisions, this requires an accountability framework that holds actors accountable to
their actions, procedures and overall compliance (Saltman et al., 2011).
Accountability has several dimensions that make it a complex construct where
financial, political and performance related dimensions overlap (ibid; Birkenhoff,
2003).

Particularly,

in

publicly-owned

hospitals,

accountability for

social

responsibility is a highly accentuated virtue in the healthcare system. This implies that
the notion of accountability is the flip side of autonomy where organizations are
responsible to the degree of freedom they assume (OECD & World Bank, 2010). In
this regard, supervisory boards and boards of directors are highly associated structures
to the notion of accountability where they are the ones who carry out functions in
relation to setting strategies and missions, giving guidance to the executive
management, evaluating the performance of the organization and exercising control
and oversight (Saltman et al., 2011).
Fundamentally, accountability of public hospitals answers basic questions that revolve
around who is accountable to whom, what are the reporting obligations of the
different actors, what is the organizational arrangement and who is involved in the
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decision-making (Saltman et al., 2010; Burke, 2004). The answers to these questions
lay down the foundation for accountability mechanisms. Birkenhoff (2003)
accentuates the notion of answerability and obligation in defining accountability. He
argues that a general definition of accountability includes "the obligation of
individuals or agencies to provide information about, and/or justification for their
actions to other actors" (ibid, p.5). It highlights the compulsory duty of actors to
provide information to justify their decisions and actions taken.
By the same token, the answerability dimension implies, in accordance, the potential
application of sanctions in cases of misconduct or inappropriate behavior which is
also an important element of accountability (ibid). In his work, Duran (2015)
highlights the power dimension that accountability should be designed to restrict it.
He argues that "it derives from an act of delegating authority from a principal to an
agent. Given that this act of delegating entails a discretional area, accountability
responds to the need to control the agent" (ibid, p.785). The control of the agent with
delegated power gets back to the question of "to whom". In the hospital setting, the
question of "to whom" is a key question because of the differing; sometimes even
conflicting, demands of the complex stakeholder groups. Thus, clarifying expectations
and relevant stakeholders is important. In this context, Burke (2004) identifies
different modes of accountability as he argues that the techniques and means of
accountability depend on the mode. The modes of accountability, as described by the
author relate to bureaucratic, professional, political, managerial, market and managed
market:
"Bureaucratic accountability, for instance, tends to focus on inputs and
processes and uses the policy tool of regulation, whereas market-based
accountability emphasizes outputs and outcomes, and uses policy tools such as
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financial incentives and public disclosure of information about performance"
(ibid, p.2).
As demonstrated, the conceptualizations of scholars on accountability differ from one
another, despite the common areas between them. However, there is still no consensus
around fundamental elements whether they are central to accountability or not. For
example, the inclusion of sanctions as a central area of accountability is not agreed
upon among academic scholars. Moreover, some authors believe that accountability is
understood in many diffused ways where the concept of accountability is
interchangeably used with the concepts of control and responsibility.
2.2.4.2.

Conceptualizing Boards of Directors for Hospitals

As highlighted earlier by Saltman et al. (2011), the role of supervisory boards and
boards of directors is an important role in accountability. Hospital boards are a key
institutional element for accountability, thus, for good governance. From an
organizational sustainability perspective, Alexander et al. (2001) highlights what
stability and continuity of hospitals boards can provide to the organization. The
authors claim that hospital boards of directors act more as a source of continuity than
as the leading change. Incremental change in governance promotes stability and
continuity. This may be highly desirable given the rapid pace of change in the
healthcare sector. Boards' stability may ensure that a hospital stays in alignment with
its mission, vision, and values. The board also provides continuity of leadership in a
time when top management turnover continues to affect the hospitals (Ibid).
Accordingly, from an institutional perspective, the existence of a board gives stability
and continuity to organization in situations of change and crises.
Because of the strategic importance of boards for hospitals, it is important to
conceptualize the boards of directors with their theories, size and composition.
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There is a debate in the literature on theories of boards, yet, many of the theories
applied to explain board behavior and structure are derived from the business world.
The notion of boards in public organizations is yet under theorized compared to that
of business for-profit board theories (Cornforth, 2003). The creation of boards started
after the industrial revolution in an attempt to create gradual separation of ownership
from control in the business sector (Chambers, 2012).
The earliest theory about boards is the agency theory, where the management
becomes the agent of the board which represents the interest of owners and
shareholders (Pointer, 1999). Other theories developed later include managerial
hegemony, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependency theory
(Chambers, 2012). The managerial hegemony implies that the main decisions are
made by the managers rather than the owners, unlike the stewardship theory where
managers and owners share together a common agenda (Ibid). The stakeholder theory
goes with the notion of representation where board members represent the different
interests of stakeholders and the resource dependency theory describes the role of
boards as to maximize the benefit of external dependencies.
For the board size, there is no agreed upon size by scholars. Determining the size of
the board depends on a number of factors which include; the size of the hospital,
number of beds, level of development and the scope of medical services and
operations conducted (CIPE & HeGTA, 2014). In addition, the budget size,
investment capital and relationship with affiliate stakeholders are also important
elements that shape the size of the hospital boards (Saltman et al., 2011). The board
composition needs to ensure diversity in necessary skills and experiences to serve on
the board. According to the guidelines for governance in hospitals, "the composition
of the board fosters diversity in expertise, age and gender. There is a good balance
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between those with healthcare background and those with other backgrounds
including financial, legal, hospitality and managerial disciplines. The board
collectively has the knowledge and expertise needed to perform its duties" (CIPE&
HeGTA, 2014, p. 47). The guidelines put diversity in the heart of board composition.
Diversity should be reflected in both clinical as well as non-clinical matters. These
include age, gender, and expertise. This implies that serving on hospital board does
not necessarily imply the dominance of clinical physicians on the board. The principle
of diversity needs to be respected in the composition of the board. In addition,
diversity is also reflected in the inclusion of both executive and non-executive
directors (ibid). The nature of boards of directors is strategic rather than operational;
which implies that the board should not be dominantly composed of executive
members. Introducing independent members to the board brings new blood to the
board and experience that might be lacking within the hospital. This will guarantee
the independence and professionalism of the board (Harding & Preker, 2009).
Another debatable question in the composition of boards is whether to include doctors
on hospital boards or not. Some scholars highlight the benefits of the involvement of
clinical professionals on governing boards (Altanlar et. al., 2015; Molinari et al.,
1995; Chambers, 2012; Culicia, 2009). The authors argue that the inclusion of clinical
professionals on the board enhances the experience of patients and has positive impact
on the operational performance of the hospital (ibid). Thus, authors accentuate the
importance of having clinical doctors in the strategic apex of the hospitals for better
performance and better outcomes.
In practice, it is a common habit among hospitals to mandate the inclusion of
physicians on the board. For example, the NHS Trust in England has the mandate to
include at least one medical director and nursing director on their boards (Ferlie,
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Ashburner & Fitzgerald, 1995). Despite the contextual experiences with the positive
impact clinical professionals have when serving on the board, the issue is broadly
inconclusive. Yet, one can infer that striking a balance in the board composition with
different expertise and backgrounds is the most important dimension in that sense. In
the special case of public hospitals, Duderstadt (2000) argues that boards of public
institutions perceive themselves as representatives of the special interests of the
bodies and/or persons that appointed them rather than being guardians of the
institution to protect and preserve it. Therefore, because university-affiliated hospitals
do not have adequate influence over their governance, they cannot structure the
boards in the best interest of the institution.

2.3.

Rationale for and types of governance reforms in public hospitals

This section shows the different drivers for reform in public hospitals and the attempts
to change its governing structures. Because university hospitals operate in the
overlapping environment of both the healthcare sector as well as higher education, it
automatically inflicts certain specifics on its governing structure compared to other
public hospitals operating only in the healthcare sector. Despite the specifics of the
hybrid environment of university hospitals, they share common reform features with
other public hospitals.
Reforms in the public domain in healthcare have varying focuses; some reform focus
on improving performance of hospitals, others on improving their efficiency, others
focus on means to cope with sector competition. In the 1990s, there was a tendency in
healthcare reforms to focus on the ability of health sector to improve overall
performance such as equity, efficiency and competition (WHO, 2000; Mossialos et
al., 2010). Automatically these policy orientations reflected on the decision-making
strategies within public hospitals. Yet, all these reform attempts did not propose any
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changes in the governing structures or adequate structural changes in hospitals.
Rather, they were focused on performance measures and setting objectives to realize
the healthcare system goals (equity, accessibility, quality, etc.). During the same
period, in the 1990s, the revolutionary book by Osbourne and Gaebler Reinventing the
Government (1993) on restructuring the public sector has influenced many scholarly
writers who developed analogies to the respective public sector domains. The book
revisits the role of the state and introduces the entrepreneurial form of government
that later on guided the conceptual frameworks of scholars. Inspired by these
principles, authors April Harding and Alexander Preker (2000) introduce
corporatization as the type of reform that is recommended for health organizations.
The authors discuss options for reforming delivery systems; the main streams are
management reforms and payment/funding reforms. These types of organizational
reforms address problems of efficiency, responsiveness and productivity. The
changing views on the role of the state in managing/providing services and leading
development efforts led to the collapse of state-led efforts.
There are three waves that permutated the scene in public service delivery: 1privatizing the production of goods/services; 2- redefining the role of the state
delivery of infrastructure services; 3- engaging in "marketizing" reform modalities
(Harding & Preker, 2000). The proposition of "marketizing" reform modalities is to
bring the best of the public and private sectors. Borrowing from the private sector
tools to manage public hospitals and arranging its governance structure in accordance,
is considered a successful model of reform (ibid). The implication of this paradigm is
that focusing on governance structures is a key determinant of any health reform that
yields positive impact on performance, competitiveness, and efficiency concerns of
health organizations. There are other scholarly writers that criticize corporatization
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reforms. Lown (2007) argues that the underlying reason for the breakdown of the
healthcare system is the onrushing marketization of all human transactions. He
debates the impact of this reform is to denature fundamental human values. However,
the debate around corporatization reforms is not conclusive.
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2.4.

Conclusion

As demonstrated in the review, governance in university hospitals is a highly
complicated construct with multifaceted dimensions. The literature highlights a range
of definitions for governance where scholars differently conceptualize it. For the
governance arrangement of university hospitals in particular, multiple governing
models are presented. Each model differently describes the relationship between the
university (and medical school) and the hospital under either a unified or a single
governance arrangement. While some articulate the necessity of the integration
between the clinical and academic functions for better overall performance of
university hospitals, others highlight the drawbacks of the integration and accentuate
successes of separate governance arrangements. However, the debate is inconclusive
as neither the unified nor the separate governance arrangement assures the strategic
balance between the academic and the clinical functions in all cases. Proponents of
respective typology highlight potential successes it can bring about to university
hospitals with associated drawbacks.
Despite the vast literature on governing models of university hospitals and
organizational arrangements that shape the relationship between the clinical and the
academic practices, there is an evident gap in addressing the governance of university
hospitals in the Egyptian context. Literature in that regard does not provide answers to
the question of how university hospitals are governed in Egypt and how relationships
are organized in this area. This work attempts to address this gap through an
exploratory study on the governing structure of university hospitals in Egypt and the
challenges to the current governing structure, and the reforms that take place in
university hospital context in Egypt.
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Chapter Three: Conceptual Framework
This study attempts to explore the governance arrangement of public university
hospitals in Egypt. It explores governing structures designs, the potential challenges
to existing structures and ways to overcome them, and the ongoing reforms within the
hospital setting to be able to achieve its tripartite mission.

3.1. Theoretical concepts
There are a number of definitions and different conceptualizations to the term
governance. The working definition guiding this study refers to Saltman et al. (2011)
definition of governance. The conceptualization of governance, according to Saltman
et al., takes the hospital as the focal point of the definition and outlines the
governance dimensions within the hospital setting. Hospital governance is defined as:
"A set of processes and tools related to decision-making in steering the totality
of its institutional activity, influencing most major aspects of organizational
behavior and recognizing the complex relationships between multiple
stakeholders" (Saltman et al., 2011, p.38).
Since this study focuses on the hospital as the unit of analysis, this definition gives a
clear understanding of what governance means within the hospital setting of publiclyowned hospitals. It accentuates several dimensions that are important to describe the
governing arrangements of hospitals. It highlights the processes and tools that shape
the decision making to steer all institutional activities, and identifying the
complexity and multiplicity of stakeholders. Given that the study focuses on
university hospitals as the unit of analysis, applying this definition is a helpful
conceptualization to understand the governance of this type of hospitals.
Derived from this definition, Saltman et al.' (2011) propose a framework for
operationalizing hospital governance from a semi-autonomous approach. Their
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framework proposes four dimensions to guide the analysis of governance in public
hospitals positioning them as the core variables for semi-autonomous hospitals. These
dimensions encompass:
1. institutional dimension
2. financial dimension
3. accountability dimension
4. correspondence between responsibility and decision making capacity
According to Saltman et al. (2011), the first three categories (institutional, financial
and accountability dimensions) address decision making that is typically decided on
the strategic level where broad objectives and strategies are put. Saltman et al.'s
framework refers to these dimensions as "strategic governance". The fourth category
is the hospital's ability to translate board's decisions to implementation and
operationalize strategic governance dimensions to practice. Saltman et al. refer to this
dimension as the correspondence between the responsibilities that the hospital
management carries out and the decision making capacity. This dimension is referred
to as "operational governance" (Saltman et al., 2011).
The presented work of Saltman et al. is applicable on publicly-owned hospitals at
large regardless of the difference in public ownerships. Because this study focuses on
a special type of public hospitals, namely university hospitals, the author of the study
adds a complementary dimension to the proposed dimensions by Saltman et al.
University hospitals have the mission not only to deliver clinical services but also to
carry out academic functions. The ability to balance between the clinical and
academic fronts needs to be reflected in the applied framework. The balance of
missions dimension is considered an additional dimension to the operational
governance dimensions highlighted by Saltman et al. The hospital is the focal point
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where the balance between the academic and clinical functions takes place. Thus, it is
considered an operational governance dimension. The five dimensions of the
proposed framework of this study are further explained. For the strategic governance
dimensions, they entail:
1- Institutional dimension:
The institutional arrangement gives answers to what the hospital is entitled to and
defines the identity of the organization. It defines the legal form of the hospital and
the set of desired objectives it attempts to achieve; which can be political, social,
economic etc. "Foundations, corporatized public companies, public entities with
delegated management and other ―new‖ types of institution typically include
mechanisms and tools to help hospitals strive for a desired set of objectives (social,
political, etc.) and to preserve public values in a market-oriented model" (Saltman et
al., 2011, p.42). Publicly-owned university hospitals are a special type of public
hospitals, which implies a special type of arrangement. In the literature, there are
different organizational arrangements that guide university hospitals' governance.
This study focuses on the unified governance arrangement of university hospitals.
Unified governance arrangement is identified as the "single model" Wietecha et al.
(2009, p.170) or as the "owner model" Weiner et al., (2001, p.116). The single/owner
models both have the same characteristics and describe the same organizational
arrangement of university hospitals. This arrangement best describes the
organizational arrangement of public university hospitals in Egypt as clinical and
academic functions are all under one overarching umbrella, the parent university. The
single/owner model implies a 'single fiduciary and one executive leader' structure
which is translated in an encompassing framework that overarches the hospital with
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affiliated clinical duties, medical faculty, education and research endeavors (Wietecha
et al., 2009, p. 170).

(Wietecha et. al., 2009, p.171)
Weiner et. al. (2001) refers to it as the owner model where all the elements of the
system are delivered under a single governance and administrative structure. "It
operates as a relatively self-contained, or ―closed‖ system in which the elements of
system finance, hospital and institutional services, professional services, and medical
education are delivered under a single governance and administrative structure" (ibid).
In this model, typically a parent university ownership structure supervises the medical
school, the faculty practice plan, and the clinical function. This governance model is
characterized by high academic control where the position of the dean unifies
authority over both endeavors, the academic as well as the clinical. In this model, the
dean typically carries out the responsibilities of the academic mission and also
exercises executive authority over the clinical operations of the service delivery in
affiliate hospitals (ibid). The authority over both clinical and academic functions is
manifested in the appointment of the head of the clinical hospitals and the academic
department chairmen. Moreover, the dean's authority is manifested in setting
budgetary targets and allocation of resources to all affiliate hospitals as well as
allocating resources between the clinical and the academic functions (ibid).
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2- Financial dimension:
Although most financial arrangements are predetermined in the public domain out of
the scope of the hospital, there are a number of changes in the financial arrangement
that makes hospitals more reflective to market challenges. The financial dimension of
the framework highlights the degree of financial autonomy of university hospitals. It
attempts to answer questions about the financial sources, the process of running costs,
and the 'freedom' that the hospitals have to handle their allocated resources (Saltman
et al., 2011, p.43). The financial dimension corresponds to the decision making
environment to determine the level of independence that the hospital enjoys to handle
investments in terms of sources, to adjust the operating expenses, and to find
additional sources of funding.
3- Accountability dimension:
The accountability dimension refers to the identification of reporting obligations that
different actors have within hospitals and the identification of who is the hospital
acting on behalf of. To determine the accountability of hospitals, direct emphasis is
placed on the board of directors in terms of their functions and their composition. The
principles and guidelines for governance in hospitals developed by the Center for
International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and the Healthcare Governance and
Transparency Association (HeGTA) puts the main features of hospital boards as being
"effective, professional, and independent, in terms of its composition, size, behavior
as well as adequately empowered to discharge its responsibilities and duties (CIPE&
HeGTA, 2014, p.45). The manifestation of the aforementioned features is in the
responsibilities, structure and composition of the board. The duties of hospital boards
include advisory role to management, performance evaluation, oversight and control.
For the operational governance dimensions, they entail:
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4- Correspondence between responsibility and decision-making capacity:
This dimension attempts to answer questions related to the level of flexibility and
autonomy the hospital has in its decision making processes. From a governance
perspective, the correspondence between responsibility and decision-making capacity
is the litmus test to the appropriateness of the organizational arrangement. This
dimension puts emphasis on the implementation level where it relates the
operationalization of high-level decisions vis-a-vis the decision-making processes
within the hospital setting. "For reasons of efficiency, effectiveness, quality and
responsiveness, the decisions on the hospital level ought to be separated from direct
political scrutiny and control" (Duran & Saltman, 2011, p.46). The main proposition
of this dimension is the sufficient space given to hospitals, with limited undue
interference to adjust its practices in response to unforeseen challenges.
5- Coordination/ balance between the organizational missions:
The university hospital setting is the focal point for the realization of the tripartite
mission. Education and training, research, and healthcare service delivery are the
three mission centers of all university hospitals. To strike a balance between all the
three mission centers is a necessity. One of the success factors for governance
arrangement in university hospitals is to strike a balance between service delivery and
other academic functions (Wietecha et al., 2009). "Effectively striking a balance is the
goal, and it supersedes the preferred desirability of any specific model" (ibid, p.174).
The need to balance these missions requires coordinating the understanding of the
complexity of the respective missions and responsibilities.

3.2.

Applying the conceptual framework to hospital structure in Egypt

The conceptual framework combines together the appropriate model that best
describes the organizational arrangement of university hospitals in Egypt with the
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operational categories to describe the governance of publicly-owned university
hospitals. Based on the nature of the institutional arrangement of university hospitals
in Egypt, the single/owner model of governance characterizes the relationships
between the university, faculty and affiliated hospitals. This setup is generalizable to
all university hospitals across Egypt because of a unified institutional arrangement
that apply to all university hospitals. The university administration is typically the
overarching umbrella that holds both academic and clinical functions. University
hospitals and other clinical enterprises are under the ownership of the university. The
dean is the position that connects both the faculty and the university hospitals. He/she
is the chairman of the general board of directors of all affiliate hospitals. The faculty
is responsible for academic related functions that feed in its two main missions,
education/training and research. The missions of the hospitals overlap with these of
the faculty in addition to treatment or healthcare service provision. So, because there
is an overlap in the missions, the faculty and the hospital have to reach an agreement
to be able to balance between the different missions.
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Source: Author constructed based on the single/owner model of university hospital
governance (Weiner et al., 2001; Wietecha et al., 2009) and the framework for assessing
public hospital governance (Saltman et al., 2011)

The above figure is a visual representation of the conceptual framework guiding this
study. It puts together the single/owner organizational arrangement that best describes
the arrangement of university hospitals in Egypt with the operational dimensions of
governance. The identified strategic governance dimensions are typically decided at
the upper organizational level manifested in the university administration and faculty
of medicine. Operational governance dimensions are reflected on the hospital level.
The ultimate goal of is the achievement of the tripartite mission of university hospital.
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology
4.1.

Qualitative research design

This study has a qualitative exploratory design aiming to examine the current
university hospital governance structure, the nature of reforms that are undertaken in
hospitals and identify the key hurdles to hospital management. The issue of university
hospital governance and organizational arrangement in Egypt is still an untapped area
of research, reaching out to key informants and policy makers is a key ingredient in
order to attain a holistic overview of the subject matter of this study. The research
questions that this study attempts to explore are how questions which by nature
require exploratory tools that only a qualitative research design offers. For this
purpose, a qualitative research design allows for deep human interaction and provides
space for exploration.

4.2.

Overall research strategy

To conduct this study, it is mainly dependent on in-depth interview strategy. "In-depth
interview strategy stipulates a primary method for gathering data" (Marshall &
Rossman, 2006). For triangulation purposes, first, interviewing process is designed to
include different key informants and decision makers. The diversity is mainly in
managerial positions and institutional affiliations. Second, verifying the obtained
primary data is through review of existing secondary data.
In-depth interviews took place in one-on-one meetings with the identified key
informants. The data collection process took one month. The duration of the
interviews ranges between 30-60 minutes each. For consistency purposes, a set of
interview questions are predetermined around how university hospitals are governed,
the reforms that take place in the hospitals setting, and the key hurdles that face
hospital management. In certain cases where further discussion is necessary, more
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probing questions are asked. Working in healthcare sector and on institutional reforms
in public university hospitals myself, made it attainable to approach the targeted
calibers and to conduct interviews with them. Because most of the interviewees are
practicing physicians and academic professionals, interviews are conducted in their
private clinics, within hospitals where they work, or in their department offices.

4.3.

Sample selection

The sampling type used to identify key interviewees in this study is non-probability
purposive sampling technique. This typology of sampling allows to put specific
criteria for the selection of participates to support the purpose of the study given the
limited expertise and relevant knowledge about this topic in Egypt. Other sampling
techniques might end up with the inclusion of participants that do not add to the topic
and credibility of the information obtained is important. The selection is done in a
way that guarantees diversity in managerial positions of leadership in university
hospitals, institutional affiliation to different public medical schools across Egypt, and
technical expertise in institutional governance and public hospital reform. Based on
these criteria, a total number of 10 one-on-one interviews are conducted. The
interviewees cover six different public medical schools across Egypt from Cairo and
some delta governorates. The following are the 10 interviewees according to their
positions:
-

Top leadership of the medical school

Interviewing one of the top leadership positions of a medical school enriches the
study with important insights on the academic functions and their alignment with the
clinical functions.
-

Top executive leadership of university hospitals
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The selection of one of the top executive leadership positions in a university hospital
is an added value to the research as the interviewee gives important insights on the
overall picture of affiliate hospitals. The participant highlights important aspects from
an execution perspective in relation to all affiliate hospitals.
-

Two hospital managers

Two hospitals managers are selected for the interview from two different public
university hospitals in Cairo. Their hands-on experience sheds light on the key
challenges that university hospitals face on the implementation level. The two
interviewees give insights on their responsibilities and define their authority in
managing their respective hospital.
-

Former assistant to the Minister of Health

The selection of a key informant from the Ministry of Health is important for the
research because the interviewee gives insights from the healthcare perspective on the
work of university hospitals. The key informant also gives a macro level perspective
on university hospitals and their work across Egypt in the provision of services.
-

Member of institutional reform team at university hospital

The selection of a member from the institutional reform team of one of the largest
university hospitals in Egypt is an enriching insight on the efforts for reform
undertaken within university hospitals. The interviewee also accurately describes the
organizational affiliations of university hospitals and the current governing structure.
-

Financial and costing officer in a university hospital

The selection of a key informant with financial expertise in university hospitals is a
crucial element to describe the financial arrangement that university hospitals follow.
-

Senior specialist
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Interviewing a clinical specialist sheds light on the key operational aspects undertaken
within the hospital premises. The interviewee gives insights on the clinical practices
and the implementation level bottle necks resulting from the existing governance
arrangements.
-

Expert on institutional governance

Interviewing a subject-matter expert in institutional governance and hospital reform is
a core added value to this study given the focus on university hospitals and their
institutional governance arrangement. The interviewee highlights key issue domains
in the hospital setting and potential ways to improve the governance arrangement.
-

Member of the Supreme Council of Universities

The selection of a member of the Supreme Council of Universities for the interview
opens up important discussions on the current reforms and policies regarding the work
of university hospitals and their implication on university hospitals. The key
informant perspective enriches this research with higher education insights on
university hospitals.
-

Top leadership from the faculty of nursing

Nursing staff is a key internal stakeholder to the hospital. Interviewing one of the top
academic positions in the faculty of nursing enriches the study with their perspective
on the work of university hospitals and their role.

4.4.

Data collection

The study depends heavily on primary data given the limited evidence in the literature
on Egypt. However, existing and relevant secondary data is reviewed. To
operationalize the primary data collection, semi-structured interviews with each
participant are conducted. The interviews' duration ranges between 30 to 60 minutes
each. For participants that allowed audio tapped, their interviews were recorded for
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accurate transcriptions. For those who did not allow recording, instant notes were
taken in a written form during the interviews. All interviews are conducted by myself
bilingually; in English and Arabic. Secondary data is collected through desk research
in form of international studies and theoretical models of governance.

4.5.

Data analysis

All 10 interviews are transcribed separately. The analysis of the interview
transcriptions is done traditionally with no use of software. The analysis followed the
thematic categories of the conceptual framework. The coding exercise is guided by
the dimensions of hospital governance from the conceptual framework. Results are
clustered in alignment with these threads from the conceptual framework: institutional
dimension, accountability dimension, financial autonomy, balance between missions,
and correspondence between responsibility and decision making capacity dimension.

4.6.

Ethical considerations

Primary data collection involves human subject matters and therefore involves a
number of ethical considerations. In acknowledgement to the fact that participants of
the study adjust their priorities and take from their time to contribute with their
knowledge to the research, thorough explanation of the scope of the study, research
purpose, and interview structure were given prior to the interviewing process.
Participants' anonymity and confidentiality are guaranteed to make sure to do the
participants no harm. Informed consent for participation is collected from participants
orally or written to guarantee voluntary participation. The Institutional Review Board
approved the proposal of the study on the 13th of July 2017 prior to the data collection
process. All possible ethical considerations were considered and approved prior to the
data collection.
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4.7.

Limitations and delimitations of the study

The expected limitation to the study from a methodological perspective is the sample
size. The relatively small number of the sample is an issue of the topic of governance
itself and the limited level of expertise, particularly in the university hospital setting.
Finding key informants that have knowledge on both university hospital and
institutional governance is a considerable limitation to the study.
Another limitation from a logistical perspective is the interview setting. Conducting
the interview on-site in hospitals or clinics infers numerous interruptions that are
unavoidable. This reflects on the duration of the interview and the depth of
information that is shared.
The delimitation of this study is that findings and policy implications derived from
this research are not generalizable to other types of hospitals. The research is mainly
focused on publicly-owned university hospitals. This implies that governance of
private or not-for-profit hospitals is not within the scope of this study because of the
different governing structures of public university hospitals compared to other types
of hospital. Moreover, privately-owned university hospitals are also out of the scope
of this study because of the different type of ownership that infers different
governance arrangement. Moreover, findings of this study are contextual and derived
from the Egyptian public sector setting.
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Chapter Five: Data Analysis and Findings
The interviews and the review of guiding mandates shed light on the governance
arrangement that describes how university hospitals are governed in Egypt according
to the five dimensions of the conceptual framework. Throughout the exploration of
the governing structure, some challenges are expressed affecting the achievement of
better outcomes of the tripartite mission. Finally, interviews reveal a number of
reforms that take place either on the national level or at the hospital level in Egypt.
In accordance, the primary data is organized under the two overarching governance
dimensions highlighted in the conceptual framework; strategic governance and
operational governance dimensions. Each of these overarching dimensions entails
several sub dimensions that describe the governance arrangement of university
hospitals in Egypt. A third cluster refers to the current and ongoing reforms taking
place in the Egyptian context.

5.1.

Strategic Governance Dimensions

The analysis of the strategic governance dimensions are in alignment with the three
indicated dimensions in the conceptual framework.
5.1.1. Institutional dimension
The institutional dimension highlights the skeleton of any governance arrangement
defining the structural relationships between the university, the medical school, and
the hospital. Key informants are asked to describe the organizational arrangement that
guides the relationships of the three actors of university hospitals in Egypt.
There is consensus among participants of the study that in Egypt the clinical and
academic functions are both under one overarching leadership manifested in the
university. The Governance Expert confirms:
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"There is full integration between the clinical and the academic functions in
university hospitals in Egypt, unlike the system in the UK, for example. This
integration is even manifested in the physical allocation of academic
departments within the hospital premises" (September 2017).
The Governance Expert expresses the integration between both functions in university
hospitals in Egypt. Clinical and academic functions are both integrated even in the
physical sense where academic departments are placed within the premises of
university hospitals unlike the UK system, where the functions are in isolation from
one another (Ovseiko, 2010). In theory, this integration in the Egyptian context is
referred to as unified governance or owner model of governance arrangement. Under
this type of arrangement, hospital, faculty, education and research endeavors are all
under one overarching framework (Wietecha et al., 2009).
The institutional arrangement of university hospitals follows the unified
governance structure where the parent university is the overarching authority.
"University hospitals belong completely to the university (full ownership) under the
authority of the university president" (Governance Expert, September 2017). The
owner of university hospitals is to the parent university. Article no. 1 of Law no.
3300/1965 confirms the statement of the Governance Expert highlighting the
ownership of university hospitals to the parent university with technical oversight by
the medical school. In accordance, the single leadership encompassing both clinical
and academic functions is manifested in the university president, as also mandated in
the same article of Law no. 3300/1965. "The highest administrative authority is
manifested in the university president where many ratifications and approvals are
centralized at the president's level not delegated even to the dean's level"
(Governance Expert, September, 2017). This implies that the ultimate authority of
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university hospitals is vested in the occupational capacity of university presidents. As
expressed by the Governance Expert, ratifications and approvals to faculty level
decisions are assigned to the university president. This authority is backed up by Law
no. 49/1972 that confirms the independence and autonomy of universities to manage
all affairs within the university. Consequently, university hospitals follow the
university president's decisions financially and administratively, yet, clinically
hospitals follow the medical school's regulation. One infers that the organizational
structure of university hospitals follow what Weiner et al. (2001) call owner model of
governance. It is a common ownership structure, under the unified governance
arrangement, where typically the university or a parent holding structure presides over
the medical school, academic plans, and the clinical functions (ibid). The owner
model operates as a closed system in which the elements of system finance, hospital
and institutional services, professional services and medical education are delivered
under a single governance and administrative structure (ibid).
In certain universities, there are research centers and independent hospitals that are
clinically not affiliated to the medical school but only to the university (i.e. Students
hospitals, research institutes). "There is no framework that coordinates the work of the
faculty and its hospitals with the research centers and hospitals directly affiliated to
the university" (Governance Expert, September, 2017). This means that universities
have other clinical institutions that are not affiliated to the medical school, thus, do
not abide by any decisions taken by their board. The university directly manages them
away from the medical school. According to the Governance Expert, the lack of a
proper framework that coordinates the works of the hospitals affiliated to the medical
school with those affiliated to the university creates redundancy and fragmentation in
the achievement of the tripartite mission.
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Under the unified governance model, the role of the dean of the medical school is
a pivotal post that contributes to both the academic as well as clinical functions.
In Egypt, school deans are appointed by a presidential decree based on the nomination
of three professors by the Minister of Higher Education. 1 Once appointed, the dean is
responsible for all the administrative, financial and academic affairs of the school
he/she heads as well as the enforcement of all the decrees and decisions by the
university council and the Supreme Council of Universities. 2 In medical schools, in
addition to the academic role that the dean plays he/she is also appointed as the
chairman of the board of directors of affiliate hospitals making him/her responsible
for the clinical functions of the hospitals as well. 3
"The dean of the school is the chairman of the hospitals' board of directors.
He/she is the link between the faculty and the hospitals. Having one
spokesperson for all hospitals and for the academic functions facilitates
agreements and transactions with internal and external stakeholders. Talking
to one person on behalf of both the academic side and the hospital side is an
advantage in facilitating decision making" (Top leadership in medical school,
September 2017).
This unification under the dean's position makes it easier to align the academic plan
with the practical training given within hospitals. Moreover, negotiations are
conducted with only one person that caters for both sides which decreases the
potential areas of conflict between the academic and the clinical interests. The
advantages highlighted by the dean express the positive aspects of the unified
governance arrangement discussed by scholarly proponents of this type of

1
2
3

Article no. 43 Law no. 49/1972
Article no. 44 Law no. 49/1972
Article no. 43 Law no. 49/1972 and Article no. 3 Law 3300/1965

| P a g e 67

arrangement. Under the unified governance model, the dean typically carries out the
responsibilities of the academic mission and also exercises executive authority over
the clinical operations of the service delivery in affiliate hospitals (Wietecha et al.,
2009). Unified arrangement creates "peace on campus" where there is a single point
of accountability and a single vision that guides both the clinical and the academic
endeavors (ibid, p.171). Also, the unified arrangement guarantees strategic focus of
both functions (Barrett, 2008). This implies that both the medical school and the
hospital pursue shared missions investing in activities that add value to both entities
(ibid). This implies the reduction of any vested interest between both the academic
and the clinical endeavors by unifying the point of management manifested in the
faculty dean. In support of this arrangement, the Former Advisor to the Minister of
Health articulates:
"The intersection between the faculty and the hospitals is at one person; the
dean. Accordingly he knows the direction of both functions and enforces the
educational and research policies from the faculty side at the hospital level.
That means that the policy directions put at the faculty level are translated in
the hospital setting through adequate supporting training modules and
programs" (September 2017).
The Former Advisor to the Minister of Health highlights another advantage of this
arrangement reflected on the mission centers of university hospitals. The main
advantage of the unification of the dean's position with the chairman's position is the
alignment of academic plans with the clinical practices. This fact works for the
interest of training and education material for young professionals and undergraduate
students who both align their theoretical knowledge with the practical experience that
they are exposed to in the hospitals (Wietecha et al., 2009). One noticeable issue in
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the appointment of the dean is the potential imbalance in the selection criteria that
may be more in favor of academic achievements and overlook necessary managerial
and leadership skills for the clinical enterprise (ibid). The imbalance in the selection
criteria would potentially undermine clinical enterprise performance.
For the balance between the academic and the clinical missions, the deans of medical
schools have three vice deans appointed by the university president 4 and one general
manager for all affiliate hospitals nominated by the dean. 5 The vice deans and the
general manager reflect the missions that the faculty of medicine as well as the
hospitals are mandated to fulfill. The figure below visually demonstrates the different
vice deans and the general manager nominated by the dean and appointed by the
university president.

Source: Author constructed
Each vice dean is responsible for one of the mission centers of university hospitals;
education, training, and research. The general manager of all affiliate hospitals is
responsible for the clinical treatment provision. However, it is important to note that
administratively and legally the medical school and the hospitals are considered two
separate entities. As articulated, the medical school strictly follows the laws of the
4
5

Article no. 47 Law no. 49/1972
Article no. 9 Law 3300/1965
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university and the academic faculty members are directly under the authority of the
university6; whereas the hospital has its separate bylaws under the authority of the
chairman of the board.7 The Former Advisor to the Minister of Health (September
2017), as well as the top leadership in medical school (September 2017) confirm that
the dean does not have any administrative authority over faculty members. Thus, the
dean only reports back to the university president potential issues with the academic
staff but cannot take decisions independently. In practice, the dean has authority
directly over nursing, house officers, and residents who fall directly under the
administration of the hospitals, as highlighted by the top leadership of the nursing
department during the interview. In alignment with the aforementioned statement, the
Dean expresses:
"In cases of investigations or penalties with the nursing staff or house officer
and residents, the general manger of hospitals asks for that from the dean and
the dean is one that issues the decision with that" (Top leadership in medical
school, September 2017).
This infers that the dean has authority over the hospital premises in terms of nursing,
clinical residents, and house officers and no authority over academic staff members.
The indicated role of the general manager of hospitals is noticeable in this setting;
meaning that he/she cannot penalize their staff within hospitals but rather refer back
to the dean for decisions. There are two observations in this setting. First, the
centralization of authority is noticeable on the level of the university president and the
level of the dean, yet, with different scopes. The authority of the university president
on academic faculty makes the dean unable to influence their behavior for academic
advancements he/she sees as important. The same rationale applies to the general
6
7

Law no. 49/1972
Law no. 3300/1965
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manager of hospitals in relation to the dean on the hospital unit. The general manager
himself/herself cannot inflict anything on the medical staff working in the hospitals
without the dean's ratification. One can infer that the authority is centralized on a
higher level than where originally decisions need to be made. This applies to
decisions taken on the hospital level and on the faculty level. In accordance, there is
an evident imbalance between the decision making right and the adequate authority to
take the decisions.
Another manifestation to the integration between clinical and academic
endeavors is manifested in the organizational hierarchy under the general
manager of hospitals. He/she is responsible for the collective performance of all
affiliate hospitals operationally, financially, and administratively. 8 The general
manager has deputy managers that assist him/her in carrying out the clinical as well
academic missions.
"The general manager of hospitals has four main deputy managers:
o Deputy for financial and administrative affairs
o Deputy for therapeutic affairs
o Deputy for training affairs
o Deputy for environmental affairs
Under each deputy there are a number of general administrations and general
departments catering for different affairs under each component. In addition,
the general manager has all hospital managers under his/her direct oversight"
(General Manager of University Hospitals, September 2017).
The deputies of the general manager mirror the academic and clinical missions on the
hospitals level. The Deputy for training affairs under the oversight of the general

8

Article no. 10 Law no. 3300/1965
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manager resembles the vice dean for graduate studies and research. He/she is
responsible for giving practical trainings to the young professionals within the
hospital premises. The existence of these deputies under the overarching umbrella of
the general manager ensures the realization of clinical and academic functions on the
hospital level. The benefit of the central departments is usually for consolidated
procurement of equipment and consumables and for the elimination of redundant
activities that take place across all hospitals with limited differentiation in the
processes.
5.1.1.1.

Key considerations of institutional aspects

The institutional dimension analysis of university hospitals highlights important
aspects: First, the analysis reveals that university hospitals across Egypt follow
the unified governance model. As demonstrated, the ultimate authority is manifested
in the university president representing the ownership interest. It is a common
ownership structure, where typically the university presides over the medical school,
academic plans, and the clinical functions. The university president appoints the dean
who is responsible for the medical school and for the hospitals. He/she is also the
chairman of the board of directors of hospitals. The dean unifies the academic and the
clinical functions under his/her occupational capacity. As described earlier, there are
other hospitals and research institutes affiliated directly to the university not to the
board of directors of all hospitals. The problem with this arrangement is the
duplication it creates. There are research centers and hospitals directly affiliated to the
university that carry out the same functions that other hospitals affiliated to the
medical school carry out. The consolidation of both types of hospitals under one
arrangement can help coordinate the work of these hospitals together.
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Second, one infers from the interviews that the unified structure is a suitable
organizational arrangement for university hospitals in Egypt. Interviewees
highlight several advantages to the unified governance model, from the key
informants' perspective. They agree that this closed system with clinical and academic
functions tied together makes meeting the academic and clinical needs easier from
within this system. Besides, the unified system aligns the academic plan with the
practical training in hospitals that young physicians undertake. Even reaching
agreements between the hospital and the medical school is easier to carry out as the
dean of the medical school is the chairman of the board of directors of hospitals. The
agreements are done with only one person that caters for both sides which decreases
the potential conflicts between the academic and the clinical interests. This fact works
for the interest of training and education material for young professionals and
undergraduate students who both align their theoretical knowledge with the practical
experience that they are exposed to in the hospitals. Although the unified governance
arrangement is associated with a number of advantages that work for the overall
vision of both clinical and academic enterprises, there are commonly cited issues with
the unified arrangement. One of the relevant issues to the Egyptian context is the
strong bias in the selection of the dean's position in favor of high academic skills
overlooking management and leadership competencies. The bias in the selection
would possibly reflect on the efficiency of the clinical enterprise.
Third, the authority is centralized on a higher level than where originally
decisions need to be made within university hospitals. Although key informants
agree that the unified governance model has a number of advantages in Egypt, the
distribution of authority is not adequate to the same level where decisions need to be
made. The authority of the university president on academic faculty makes the dean
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unable to influence their behavior for academic advancements he/she sees as
important. The same rationale applies to the general manager of hospitals in relation
to the dean. The general manager himself/herself cannot inflict anything on the
medical staff working in the hospitals without the dean's ratification. This creates an
evident imbalance between the decision making right and the adequate authority to
take the decisions.
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5.1.2. Accountability dimension
5.1.2.1.

Internal accountability mechanisms of university hospitals

Accountability sheds light on the roles and responsibilities of the different actors in
the university hospitals setting. It highlights the hospitals' obligations towards their
supervisory body.
University hospitals' board of directors is the supervisory body that holds
hospitals accountable to their performance. The board of directors is the
overarching authority over all affiliate hospitals to the university that is responsible
for all affairs of the hospitals and puts general policies to guide their work. 9 The
decisions of the board have to be reported back to the university president, according
to article no. 2 of the same decree.10 "The mandates that guide the work and
composition of hospital boards date back to the 1960s. You can imagine how outdated
and out of context these mandates are to today's hospital setting" (Governance
Expert, September 2017).
There are two important remarks to point out. First, the mandates guiding the work of
hospital boards are relatively outdated which reflects on their capacity to respond to
the current environmental dynamics, in accordance with the Governance Expert
statement. The context during the inception of these laws changed a lot making them
irrelevant in some cases and do not enable hospitals to respond to today's demands
and evolving needs. For example, in the 1960s during the socialist era in Egypt
representation was a highly accentuated virtue. This is reflected in the wide
representation serving on the board. In today's context, other board theories may

9

Presidential Decree no. 3300/1965
Article no. 4 Presidential Decree no. 3300/1965

10
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better apply to the current setting and enable the hospitals to meet the needs of the
sector.
Although there is no fixed number of directors to serve on the board, the size of
the boards tends to be big. The board encompasses a wide representation of
stakeholders which ranges from 30 to 70 members. As previously mentioned, the big
size of the board is referred to the relatively large representation mandated in the
Presidential Decree no. 3300/1965.11
"The board represents the different stakeholder groups and their respective
interests. It is chaired by the dean of the faculty of medicine and encompasses
the heads of all departments, the managers of hospitals, head of the nursing,
the four deputy directors of hospitals, and other stakeholder representatives
such as the armed forces, the police, the media, public figures etc." (Top
leadership in medical school, September 2017).
The top leadership in medical school expresses the wide array of stakeholders that are
represented on the board encompassing both internal and external stakeholders. 12 The
chairman of the board is the dean of the faculty of medicine. In addition, there are
representatives from other auxiliary departments as well as external public figures
serving on the board.
There are several considerations in relation to the board of director's composition. The
board composition follows the stakeholder theory of boards of directors where
different stakeholder interests are represented on the board (Chambers, 2012). The
stakeholder approach to boards recognizes the need to position the organization
within a wider societal context. It mandates the inclusion of stakeholder interests
within the organization through their representation in boards (ibid). In Egypt, during
11
12

Article 3
Presidential Decree no. 3300/1965
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the 1960s representation was highly accentuated in all national policies. This virtue is
manifested in the composition of the board that highly emphasizes on the
representation of different stakeholder groups. Yet, this resulted in a large board size
with diverse interests that in some cases are conflicting. The conflicting interest of the
stakeholders serving on the board does not give objective basis for the evaluation of
board actions and no guidance to how these interests are prioritized (Slinger,
1998).Another point in relation to the board composition is the imbalance in the
representation of executive versus non-executive members to the board. It is clear
from the board composition that, first, the number of executive members outweighs
the number of non-executive members and second, the representative nature of the
board makes its size too big to pin down strategies and policies for all affiliate
hospitals.
In the empirical context, interviewees express similar disadvantages resulting
from the current board composition and size. In many cases, board meetings
become a place where operational matters rather than strategic planning are discussed
and very specific departmental issues are brought to the agenda. These two issues
combined encroach on the time for discussions of strategic matters and overall
organizational performance of hospitals. According to the statement expressed by the
member of institutional reform team,
"Theoretically, the board is mandated to put the strategy and overall direction to
all its hospitals. Realistically speaking, it does not because board members raise
individual issues from their departments on board meetings rather than discuss
important strategic issues. In addition, the time allocated for important versus
unimportant matters is limited. It does not give enough space to go through
important matters thoroughly" (September 2017).
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The key informant expresses his concern about the time spent during board meetings
to discuss individual academic department issues rather than making use of the time
for strategy development for the affiliate hospitals. Moreover, the time allocation is
imbalanced between trivial versus important matters. This automatically results in
unbalanced meetings where strategic matters are not allocated enough time and
academic faculty take the lead in setting the agenda. This indicates that the academic
faculty encroaches on the priorities of hospitals during the meetings. In alignment
with the statement of the member of institutional reform team, one of the interviewed
university hospital managers expresses,
"Most of our board meetings are mainly about management issues that encroach
on the time of other strategic matters. This is why we hardly find time to put plans
and discuss strategic issues" (University Hospital Manager 1, August 2017).
The hospital manager accentuates the operational indulgence of the board in
operational discussions rather than on long term strategy for all affiliate hospitals.
Harding and Preker (2009) accentuate the strategic nature of board of directors where
operational and purely executive matters should not be discussed. In theory, the main
responsibility of the board is giving directions and oversight to all affiliate hospitals
(CIPE & HeGTA, 2014). The board of directors' main responsibility is to put the
overall vision of the hospital and to pin down general policies to guide the execution
on the hospital's level (ibid). Applying these points to the Egyptian context, one infers
that the practices of hospital boards are not in alignment with the theories.
5.1.2.1.

External governmental accountability mechanisms in Egypt

University hospitals are publicly-owned which implies that they adhere to external
regulatory and oversight guidelines in Egypt as other publicly-owned institutions.
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The Central Auditing Organization and the Administrative Control Authority
are considered the two main oversight bodies for financial transparency and for
compliance with administrative procedures. The Central Auditing Organization
(also named as Accountability State Authority) is an autonomous accountability body
directly affiliated to the State President (Accountability State Authority, 2017). The
main responsibility of the organization is to exercise oversight on public funds and
hold public institutions accountable to their financial practices (ibid).
In relation to public university hospitals, they fall under the area of jurisdiction of the
Central Auditing Organization as they are publicly-owned.
In relation to the hospital, the Organization has the right to investigate any financial
aspect related to the hospital. As explained by University Hospital Manager 1:
"Any financial aspect regarding the expenditure or revenues of the hospital
falls under the mandate of the Central Auditing Organization and as a
hospital manager I am answerable to the Organization. For example, the
Organization would send out an official letter asking about the justification
for high electricity bills or water consumption, purchase of new devices etc."
(August 2017).
The University Hospital Manager points out the common situations when the Central
Auditing Organization inspects the financial performance of the hospital. The
Organization might investigate or does a random inspection on the patterns of
expenditure and the justification for the given consumption of overheads, for
example.
The Administrative Control Authority areas of jurisdiction, as mandated in law no.
54/1964, covers all state administrative bodies, public business sector, public
institutions, private sector contributing to public work, and any other form of
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organization that the state contributes to (Administrative Control Authority, 2017). It
helps the State President as well as other executive authority actors (Cabinet
Ministers, Governors etc.) to verify potential areas of improvement in the
administrative and financial systems of public organizations and to ensure that public
organizations follow legal and administrative procedures properly (ibid).
Publicly-owned university hospitals are under the mandate of the Administrative
Control Authority as they are considered public institutions. From an implementation
perspective, University Hospital Manager 1 explains:
"The Administrative Control Authority would directly contact the hospital
manager in cases such as: investigating issues of public tender procedures for
medical supplies such as pharmaceuticals and medical devices, inspecting the
expiry periods of medical supplies, and making sure that administrative and
legal procedures are generally followed within the hospital" (August 2017).
In a situation where compliance with legal and administrative procedures is at stake,
the Administrative Control Authority has the right to directly contact the hospital
manager and investigate the issue. In other cases, the Authority can do random
inspections to validate the compliance of the hospital.
In accordance, one infers that university hospitals are held accountable financially to
the Central Auditing Organization and administratively to the Administrative Control
Authority. Investigations and inspections are commonly undertaken on the hospital
unit through the hospital manager.
5.1.2.2.

Key considerations of accountability aspects

The accountability dimension underscores some aspects within university hospital
setting:
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First, the current laws that govern university hospitals are outdated in relation to
the current context. The mandates that guide the board go back to the year 1965.
Since the inception of this decree, the context of university hospitals changed making
it difficult for boards to respond to today's demands and evolving needs.
Second, the board of directors' composition and size do not enable it to perform
its oversight and supervisory functions over affiliate university hospitals. The
actual size of the board of directors is relatively large. The size of the boards tends to
be big encompassing a wide representation of stakeholders which ranges from 30 to
70 members. The size of the board is too large to discuss strategic decisions for all
hospitals in a focused and constructive manner. The composition of the board
encompasses a wide range of stakeholders, yet, the proportion of executive versus
non-executive directors is high. Consequently, board meetings tend to be more
operational than strategic, as expressed by some key informants. In addition, the
domination of the academic staff also reflects on the discussions taking place on the
board. The clinical aspects of hospitals tend to undermined by academic aspects that
are brought on the agenda during board meetings.
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5.1.3.

Financial dimension

University hospitals have diversified sources of finance and funding streams. These
encompass the predetermined budget by the Ministry of Finance, investment plans
that are prepared by the administrative government units, submitted to the Ministry of
Planning and Administrative Reform for negotiation, self-funding activities that
hospitals conduct, special revenue generating medical service units, and donations.
These sources are valid in all university hospitals in Egypt and do not include the
financial aspects of the academic staff.
5.1.3.1.

State budget:

The budget defined by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is considered the main stream
of finance to university hospitals. Generally, the state budget is divided into 6 sections
in line-budget item form for spending (MoF, 2016). The most important sections of
the line-item budget correspond to chapter one, two, and six of the state budget. Each
of the six lines has a fixed amount allocated that cannot be transferred from one line
item to another one and cannot be spent on items that are not already set out in the
budget (ibid). However, some flexibility is given to move within the same line item of
the budget. All hospitals have to spend within the limits of this budget and are not
allowed to spend above the allocated sum from the state budget. The state budget is
decided upon negotiations taking place between MoF and the university. However, as
indicted by the Finance and Costing Officer at one of the university hospitals:
"Financial forecasts are conducted by the academic faculty where they use old
data that does not reflect the current financial numbers. They are done with
limited financial science behind it. The faculty staff shoots in the budget
because they know they will get into a "bargaining" process with MoF"
(Finance/ Costing Officer, September 2017).
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The statement by the Finance Officer highlights two main aspects. First, the budget
decided on in an unscientific way by academics that do not necessarily have sufficient
financial knowledge. The forecasts of the hospitals are conducted in a traditional
manner by faculty members with the exception of the wage and salaries of
administrative employees as it follows the national wage structure13 and the
investment line in the budget. Second, the Finance Officer referred to the process as a
"bargaining" process indicating a vague pathway that guides the allocation of budget
which does not reflect the actual financial needs of the hospitals.
From an autonomy perspective, obviously there is limited flexibility and freedom to
reallocate or transfer funds across the different line items by the decision makers of
university hospitals. The predetermined budget at the macro level does not allow
flexibility for hospital leadership to handle these finances. Another consideration is
the lack of clear allocation of financial resources that reflects the different mission
centers to make sure that no mission encroaches on the other.
5.1.3.2.

Additional sources of funding:

To overcome the rigidity of the public budget, most university hospitals in Egypt have
created additional sources of funding to sustain the operations.
"These revenue generating activities include for-fee service units, out-of-pocket
payments, insurance, treatment on the expense of state and special agreements.
These revenues are dedicated to the clinical practices within the hospital only."
(Finance/ Costing Officer, September 2017).
The Finance Officer highlights the four main revenue generating streams that flow
with funds to university hospitals. The revenues are usually under the authority of the

13

Law no. 81

| P a g e 83

general manager of hospitals as per the law he/she is the responsible person for the
financials of all hospitals. 14


For-fee Service Unit (Elag b Agr)

The for-fee service units are originally incepted through the university president
decree to generate revenue to cover the shortage in budget and generate cash flow to
the hospital processes. The units are in different specialties located across all
hospitals.
"From the revenues of the for-fee service units, 10% are paid for taxes, 20% for
hospital fees and the rest is divided into 40% benefits and bonuses for the
employees and 60% for improving services of the clinical department. The
aforementioned 60% and 40% distribution for benefits and improvement are
controlled by the heads of the For Fee Service units" (Finance/ Costing Officer,
September 2017).
The percentile distribution expressed by the Finance Officer implies important
dynamics of who has authority over the revenues of the for-fee service units. Because
these units are physically allocated within the hospital premises, a portion of the
revenues is used to cross subsidize other operations in the hospital. Other portions go
to taxes and to employees in the unit. Moreover, the majority of the revenues go to
support the department which is one of the advantages of the integration between
clinical and academic functions. Revenue generating units can financially support the
advancement of the academic departments (Barrett, 2008). In practice, this is what
happens where the revenues from the for-fee-service units subsidize academic
advancements in the department.


14

Insurance

Law no. 3300/1965
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There are private insurance companies/ organizations that receive services from
university hospitals. However, as highlighted by the Governance Expert:
"University hospitals are not successful in attracting necessary private insurance
companies because its existing medical wards fail to meet the health insurance
requirements for providing medical services" (Governance Expert, September
2017).
The Governance Expert accentuates that university hospitals are not able to attract
private insurance companies because they do not meet the health insurance standards.
This indicates a relatively low stream of revenues from this part.


Program of Treatment at the Expense of the State (PTES)

Medical treatment system at the expense of the state provides medical, therapeutic
and surgical services for patients who are non-beneficiaries of neither public nor
private health insurance systems and cannot afford medical services (World Bank,
2006).
"These patients are entitled to go to a unit at the Ministry of Health and get an
amount of money to pay for the medical procedures they need. This amount is
defined before the treatment is given to the eligible patients. The money is
transferred later to the hospital" (Finance/ Costing Officer, September 2017).
The Finance Officer identifies the revenues from the PTES to be a source of funding
for hospitals. Patients who are not covered by any medical insurance company apply
for PTES and upon the completion of the medical procedure the hospital is paid for
the procedure by PTES.


Special Agreements

There is a possibility to have special agreements with companies or organizations to
treat patients for specific agreed upon rates.
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"However, these agreements are currently minimal due to the unsatisfactory
standard of medical services provided, which fall below the minimum
requested by these hospitals"(Finance/ Costing Officer, September 2017).
In alignment with the statement of the Governance Expert on the lacking
competitiveness of university hospitals to attract private insurance, the Finance
Officer highlights the unsatisfactory standard of services that do not attract special
agreements with the organizations.
5.1.3.3.

Donations:

In the Egyptian context, paying donations for university hospitals take a formal path
and an informal path. On the one hand, there are formal donations that consist of two
main types; monetary donations as in cash payments and in-kind donations in the
form of medical consumables, equipment, etc. or other items that the hospital puts on
a list to channel donation funds. These donations are given either through institutions
or through individual payers. Within the institutional setup of university hospitals
there is an administration for fundraising that collects donations and documents them.
In addition, there are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that help in
fundraising. In some hospitals there are NGO arms placed within the hospitals to
handle donations; which are mostly the Zaka Fund and not-for-profit association
affiliated to the hospital.
On the other hand, there are other informal streams of donations. As highlighted by
the member of institutional reform team:
"Donations are given informally when individuals donate money to entrusted
physicians who are usually from their circle of friends and acquaintances to
support needy cases or to support in the purchase of equipment of medical
consumables. This is a common practice in Egypt. Other forms of informal
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donations take place when physicians themselves pay out of their own money
to cover the expenses of needy patients directly" (September 2017).
The Member of Institutional Reform Team underscores the different forms of
informal donations that are usually not registered in the official financial system of
the hospital. There are a number of associated problems with these informal donations
as further explained by the Member of Institutional Reform Team,
"The problem with informal donations, particularly in cases where medical
devices are purchased, is reflected on their maintenance. The running costs
associated with the maintenance of the equipment is paid by the hospital, which
indirectly constitutes additional financial burdens on the hospital finances that
was not accounted for initially" (September 2017).
This means that the purchase of additional devices burdens the maintenance costs that
forces hospital management to incur the burden of finance. The hospital is held
responsible to repair the devices even if they are not formally registered. In addition,
the accountability of the hospital leadership is not only confined to the maintenance of
the equipment but expands also to leadership's responsibility to safeguard public
assets.
In addition,
"Cases of duplicating equipment with the same specifications and the same scope
are a common issue resulting from informal donations. For example, in the
cardiology department at our hospital, we have five catheterization laboratories
with the same specifications serving the same cardiac patients. There are no
statistical ratios that justify the existence of the five laboratories" (Senior
Specialist, August 2017).
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The Senior Specialist points out the negative repercussions of informal donations
where the same equipment is purchased resulting in underutilization of existing
devices and duplication of equipment. This mismanagement of donations gives
negative image of public hospitals and results in reduction of donations.
5.1.3.4.

Special funds:

The special funds refer dominantly to the revenue streams from the units with special
purpose. These units are allocated within the hospitals which were initially designed
through university decrees to generate revenue to support the hospital financially. The
Governance Expert sheds light on the units with special purpose special financial
arrangement saying:
"The units with special purpose were incepted by the university as a way to
support hospitals financially. Although these units are physically allocated
with the hospital premises, yet, they are administratively, financially, and
technically independent from the hospital management and are under the
direct authority of the Vice Dean for the Environment and Community Service.
In accordance, the revenues are under the faculty not to the hospital"
(Governance Expert, September, 2017).
The interviewee illustrates two main aspects of units with special purpose. First,
despite the physical allocation of the units within the premises of the hospitals they do
not fall under the authority of the hospital manager. This applies not only on the
financial aspects but also on administrative and technical aspects. Second, the
revenues generated from the units are allocated directly to the academic departments
not to the clinical hospitals. As highlighted in the literature, the integration between
the clinical and academic functions can create supporting funds to other academic
advancements (Barrett, 2008). However, in practice this does not seem to be practical
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because the academic function cannot encroach on the financial resources of the
clinical functions. In fact, the practice in Egypt resulted in undermining the clinical
mission in favor of the academic function. This goes more in alignment with
Wietecha et al. (2009) proposition about the single governance model. The authors
indicate that the clinical mission is more likely to be undermined under this
governance model given that it is under the auspices of the academic arm (ibid).
Other interviewees accentuated this point as well. The member of institutional reform
team explains:
"Institutionally, all units are in direct affiliation to the faculty of medicine
management and are under the leadership of the Vice Dean for environment
affairs and community service" (September 2017).
Despite the clinical nature of the services provided by the units with special purpose,
financial revenues are linked to the academic faculty not to the hospitals. The
financial accountability of these units is, therefore, to the Vice Dean for environment
affairs and community services rather than to the hospital manager. Besides, the units
that were originally designed to help cross subsidize other departments of the hospital
are generating losses. "The units do not offer competitive quality services and updated
equipment to attract private and institutional payers" (Member of institutional reform
team, September 2017). Gradually, these units' attractiveness diminished and OOP
patients and private institutions stopped seeking services from these units.
In practice, there are a number of issues with the management of the units with special
purpose. First, the physical allocation within a public hospital automatically forces the
units to accept referrals from the hospital and offer services for free, although they are
not mandated to do so. The mixture between out-of-pocket and free-of-charge patients
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complicates the finance of the hospital as the unit of analysis. The Governance Expert
expresses some consequences of the placement of these units within the hospitals.
"The placement of these units within the hospital premises has a number of
consequences. Being physically placed in a public free-of-charge hospital
mandates the units to serve poor patients equally as out-of-pocket patients. In
addition, there are special services offered only in these units and are not
available in the other hospital departments. Poor patients cannot be restricted
from using these services, in particular when their free-of-charge alternatives
are not available" (Governance Expert, September, 2017).
Being a publicly-owned university hospital does not allow for any skimming practices
to poor patients, which consequently means the provision of services free-of-charge
even if the unit is for profit.
The second issue is in relation to the medical workforce. The same staff of physicians
that works in the hospital works in these units as well. This creates a fragmented
workload for physicians as well as a greater incentive to work for the for-profit units
than working in the free-of-charge hospital departments. This is accentuated by the
Former Advisor to the Minister of Health who articulates "It is very common among
residents and faculty members to prefer working in the units with a special purpose
rather than in the hospitals free-of-charge as it is more economically rewarding. Of
course this has negative repercussions on the medical workforce in the hospital"
(September, 2017).
Consequently, physicians are more incentivized to work for the units with special
purpose in comparison to the free-of-charge units of the hospital. The statement by the
Governance Expert reinforces the same idea as well where he states "There is a clear
fragmentation of the workload as the same doctors work at both; these units and the
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hospital" (September 2017). He accentuates the fragmentation of the workload of
physicians between the hospital and the units.
For the consolidation of all the diversified funding sources, the general manager of
hospitals is the person where the consolidated financial balances should be reported
back. 15 The Finance Officer points out:
"In theory, the general manager of hospitals is the one who knows all
financial streams and consolidated balances. He does not review financial
data from a number of units within the hospitals, such as the units with special
purpose. This creates loopholes making the financial system of university
hospitals vulnerable to corruption" (September 2017).
The Finance Officer further pinpoints that the general manager of hospitals is the
person where all financial streams consolidate. In practice, this is a challenging task
because first, there are unrecorded financials, for example informal donations.
Second, the revenues of the units with special purpose fall under the Vice Dean for
Environmental Affairs and Community Service. The unconsolidated financial system
automatically results in vulnerability to corruption.
5.1.3.5 Key considerations of financial aspects

The description of the financial system of university hospitals reveals some
considerations:
First, without proper consolidation of all financial streams a highly fragmented
system is created. Having different sources of funding is a positive approach to
diversify the financial portfolio. However, because there is no electronic system that
consolidates all financial data together makes tracing the total figures quite difficult.
In addition, there are informal donations flow in the hospital finances without
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appearing anywhere on the system. Moreover, there are unregistered equipment and
medical devices that do not appear in the system incurring extra maintenance costs
that were not originally accounted for. In accordance, the general manager of
hospitals cannot trace back all finances of affiliate hospitals, thus, sound financial
decisions are hard to take.
Second, the financial status of the units with special purpose is problematic,
particularly, because they are allocated within the hospitals' premises.
Accordingly, they encroach on the assets and the workforce of the hospital. Moreover,
the revenue from these units flows to the medical school not to the hospital. That
reflects an evident imbalance where the academic functions of the hospital undermine
the clinical function.
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5.2.

Operational Governance Dimensions

In alignment with the conceptual framework, the operational dimension includes the
correspondence between responsibility and decision making capacity and the balance
between the missions.
5.2.1 Correspondence between responsibility and decision making capacity
dimension
The hospital is the level of implementation where the operationalization of all
strategic decisions materializes. From the governance perspective, the correspondence
between the responsibilities that hospital managers are mandated to carry out in
relation to their decision-making capacity is the actual indicator on the
appropriateness of the organizational arrangement of university hospitals.
5.2.1.1 Centralization of decision making

Interestingly, key informants' responses to the decision making capacity of hospital
managers similarly underscore the serious disparity between what managers are held
accountable for and the limited authority they exercise. The Governance Expert
explains that,
"The authority and decision making within university hospitals are very
centralized. Although the hospital manager is at the hospital unit where a
considerable level of authority is needed for execution, he/she is not granted the
needed level of autonomy in practice" (September 2017).
There is inadequate level of empowerment to hospital managers compared to the
responsibilities that they have to carry out. Being at the operational level of
governance, hospital managers are not autonomous enough for execution. This is
referred back to the centralized nature of the system. Because of the centralized nature
of the higher education system in the Egyptian context (OECD & World Bank, 2010),
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the decisions that need to taken on the hospital level have to be reported to the general
manager of hospitals as he/she is the responsible person for all hospital affairs. Yet,
his/her signatures have to be ratified by the dean as well. Consequently, a long chain
has been created for decision making. Creation of bottlenecks, lengthy process and
undermined executive power of hospital managers are common repercussions. As
expressed by the Senior Specialist:
"Bylaws do not empower hospital managers to take decisions directly with the
exception of minimal direct interventions in relation to the purchase of minimal
operation material for emergency cases, the purchase of a small number of
pharmaceuticals etc. Otherwise the decision for other matters has to follow a
lengthy process" (Senior Specialist, August 2017).
The statement of the Senior Specialist accentuates the undermined executive power of
hospital managers. The manager's decision making capacity is confined to minimal
interventions that do not help managers advance their work in hospitals.
Another restraining factor to hospital managers is the unclear reporting obligations of
some auxiliary departments placed within the hospital. There is a common practice
among university hospitals in Egypt which is to have central auxiliary departments
like finance, administrative affairs, human resource, procurement, maintenance,
security etc. with a representation or "liaison" of these departments within hospitals.
"Most of the auxiliary departments do not report to the hospital manager but
rather to their managers in the central administration, which leaves the
manager no space to enforce his authority over their practices. Of course this
is a major hampering factor to hospital managers. In practice, the managers'
authority is manifested only on the nursing staff, residents (not academic staff
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members), and house officers" (Member of institutional reform team,
September 2017).
In cases where hospitals have central departments, their representatives in the
hospitals do not have reporting obligations towards the hospital manager. They report
directly to their respective department heads. The only administrative authority is over
the residents, nurses, and the house officers. However, even this authority is not
absolute. Decisions in this regard have to be ratified by the general manager and the
dean.
5.2.1.2 Financial constraints facing hospital managers

Moreover, from a financial point of view, the hospital manager does not have direct
authority over the funding streams in terms of relocating them or negotiating the
budget. As highlighted earlier in the analysis of the financial dimension, the budget
allocated by the Ministry of Finance is fixed according to certain line-items that
hospital managers cannot relocate. Moreover, units with special purpose are
financially, administratively and technically independent from the hospital
management, despite their physical allocation. Their financial revenues stream into
the faculty pool of resources rather than into the hospital. One of the interviewed
university hospital manager states:
"These units with special purpose use the resources of the hospital as in
facility, electricity supply, infrastructure, and water supply. However, their
revenues are linked to the faculty through the vice dean for environmental
affairs and community service rather than the general manager of affiliate
hospitals" (University Hospital Manager 1, August 2017).
This automatically undermines any control over these units. In practice, hospital
managers have relative control over the donations only. "Only donations fall under
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the authority of the manager from where he/she can pay for extra expenses and
renovation for the hospital" (Former Advisor to the Minister of Health, September,
2017).
5.2.1.3 Accountability versus autonomy over clinical practices in university hospitals

For the clinical practices, in essence, the hospital manager is held accountable for the
overall clinical performance of the hospital. However, in practice, the heads of the
clinical departments exercise 'informal authority' over clinical outcomes but are not
held accountable for clinical outcomes. "The informal authority that department
heads exercise restraints the managers' execution power and limit their authority over
the clinical practices" (Former Advisor to the Minister of Health, September 2017).
The Governance Expert accentuates the same point highlighted by the Former
Advisor to the Minister of Health about the informal power structure of department
heads. He states:
"The inadequate empowerment to hospital leadership compared to the power
structure of the department council and the departments makes the academic
structure much more powerful compared to the hospital" (September 2017).
As explained by the Governance Expert, the academic structure overpowers the
hospital structure. This disturbs the balance within the hospital setting. There is high
accountability on the hospital manager; yet, control over clinical practices lays in the
hands of the department heads. He gives another example to the imbalance between
the authority and accountability given to hospital managers versus department heads.
He states:
"Within the hospital setting, the lines of authority are quite blurry between the
manager and the faculty members. In a situation, where faculty staff members
are late for the list of operations and this hampers the flow in the Operating
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Room (OR), the hospital manager cannot really penalize them, although this
affects the overall efficiency of the hospital negatively. Yet, when patients do
not find the services the hospital management is held accountable"
(September 2017).
This clearly accentuates the restrained authority of hospital managers to influence
clinical operations within the hospital. Although hospital managers have the right to
manage clinical practices of the departments within the hospital, their authority is
bind by the informal relations that are formed due to the collegial ties between them.
5.2.1.4 Key considerations on the correspondence between decision making capacity and
responsibility

There are some considerations for the analysis of the correspondence between the
decision making capacity versus responsibilities dimension:
First, it is evident that hospital managers are not adequately empowered in
alignment with the responsibilities assigned to them. There are multiple
manifestations to the lack of decision making capacity of hospital managers;
clinically, financially and administratively.
Administratively, ratification of any decision on the hospital level has to follow a
lengthy processes starting with the general manager of hospitals and followed by the
dean. In addition, auxiliary departments do not have reporting obligations towards the
hospital manager.
Financially, most of the financial decisions are predetermined by the university
president and the dean. The freedom of handling financial resources are only confined
to the donations flowing to the hospitals otherwise the hospital manager does not have
any decision making capacity to influence financial aspects.
Clinically, the informal power structure of academic department heads constitutes
pressure on hospital manager restricting them from influencing clinical practices in
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the hospital. All these factors combined restrain hospital mangers from exercising
their authority over the clinical aspects, yet, are held accountable for everything
within the premises of the hospital.
Second, the situation of the units with special purpose within hospitals is
problematic in relation to the hospital managers' decision making capacity and
resource mobilization. These units are completely out of the control of the hospital
manager; financially and administratively. However, there physical allocation within
hospitals has two repercussions. Primarily, these units encroach on the hospitals'
assets and overheads with no legitimate control over them by the hospital manager.
Moreover, the mixture between the OOP patients and the free-of-charge patients
creates economic pressure on the units. As explained earlier, when the hospital does
not have a service that the units have, free-of-charge patients are transferred to these
units to receive the service. Accordingly, the burden of economic loses is incurred by
the units hampering them from generating revenue as mandated.
5.2.2

Coordination/balance between the missions

Balancing the different missions of university hospitals is a key element to the success
of their overall work. The hospital is the point of intersection where all three missions
converge which implies that they have to be equally balanced in terms of resource
allocation, time spent, financial planning for better overall outcomes.
Most of the key informants stress on the lacking balance between the missions in the
hospital setting as one of the greatest challenges to university hospitals. Some
missions encroach on the others in terms of resources and budget allocation. The
Governance Expert illustrates the different scenarios where imbalances take place in
the hospital setting. He states:
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"In Egypt, the treatment role of university hospitals increased and
overwhelmed the training and education role. Patients prefer services
provided by university hospitals compared to other MOH hospitals. The high
academic calibers in university hospitals drive patients to go to university
hospitals rather than to other types of hospitals. Although the main mission
center of university hospitals is education and training of young professional
physicians, the treatment component being only a support center encroached
on the other core missions. A large part of the budget is spent on treatment
rather than on education; where the latter is the main mission center of these
hospitals. This encroachment is manifested in the media which highlights the
number of patients treated there and the problems associated to that, whereas
the main indicator should be the level of excellence of medical school
graduates, research contribution and quality of training as well" (Governance
Expert, September 2017).
It is underscored in this statement that the necessary balance between the missions of
university hospitals is not realized in the Egyptian context. More focus is given to the
treatment mission, which encroaches on the other missions in terms of administrative
capacity as well as budget allocation. Besides, the indicator of the quality of work that
university hospitals produce is determined based only on the number of patients they
serve and the quality of healthcare service delivery. Practically speaking, being a
university hospital implies a strong educational and professional development
component that cannot be undermined by service delivery only. Quality of graduating
physicians and research contributions are as equally important indicators as the
quality of service delivery. In line with the literature in that context, university
hospitals provide clinical education and training to future and current doctors, nurses
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and other health professionals, in addition to delivering medical care to patients
(Collins English Dictionary; Association of UK University Hospitals, 2012). One
infers that the main proposition of university hospitals are education and training and
finally to deliver medical services to patients.
The other typical scenario where imbalance takes place is when the academic
functions hamper university hospitals from operational efficiency compared to
international benchmarks. As expressed by the Governance Expert:
"Research and training might hamper the hospital's operational efficiency,
thus, financial aspects of the hospital. An example from the ophthalmology
discourse, a cataract surges that takes on average 15 minutes takes in a
demonstrative training up to 2 hours; which can hamper the hospital
operations" (Governance expert, September 2017).
From an operational efficiency perspective, the training of young professionals and
educational case studies can encroach on the efficiency of the operative and
diagnostic processes where a medical intervention can be conducted for educational
purposes taking longer than guidelines mandate. To overcome this imbalance, the
board of directors or trustees of hospitals has to responsibility to not compromise one
mission on the expense of the other (Wietecha et al., 2009).
Another aspect of balancing the different missions with the hospital setting is
manifested in the physical integration between the academic departments and the
hospitals. The placement of clinical departments within the hospital premises enforces
the educational and training purposes. Most of the key informants and interviewees
agreed that the separation between the hospital and the faculty is not advisable. In
cases where the medical school is geographically in distance from the hospital,
training and education are affected. As stated by the Senior Specialist:

| P a g e 111

"Training of physicians is not well-supported because of the distance between
the faculty and the hospital. Trainings given in the faculty automatically result
in the absence of the physicians from the hospital which is not feasible. In the
other university hospital I serve at, the school is placed within the hospital
where trainings and educational seminars are conducted directly before our
day work starts in the clinics and the other sections of the hospital. Once we
are done with the lecture, we directly get back to the clinics without losing
time in transportation" (Senior Specialist, September 2017).
This implies that the current geographical integration between the hospital and the
medical school results in a balanced time allocation between the educational and the
treatment provision. As explained by the Senior Specialist, the physical integration
allows physicians to attend educational lectures and seminars without encroaching on
the time of clinical service provision. In accordance, all missions are met from within
the without seeking them from outside (Weiner et al., 2001).
5.2.2.1 Key considerations on the coordination/ balance of missions

These are couple of important highlights from the coordination of university hospitals'
missions dimension:
First, the current physical integration between the hospital and medical school
strikes a balance between the mission centers where the transition between the
activities does not encroach on the other missions. The proximity of the medical
school from the hospital allows for smoother transitions between the different
missions. Given that the academic faculty members are also part of the medical team
in hospitals, the physical integration allows them to carry out both clinical and
academic functions.
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Second, there are two typical cases where the missions are not always balanced.
From an operational perspective, educational functions can hamper the efficiency of
clinical practices in the hospital. In accordance, academic missions can undermine
clinical practices. The other typical scenario is in cases where patient treatment
exhausts the budget of other academic activities because there is high demand on
services from university hospitals.
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5.3 Current/ongoing reforms within university hospitals
Current reforms targeting university hospitals can be classified into two main
categories; national level reforms championed by national regulatory bodies and
localized organization level reforms championed by hospital leadership.
5.3.1

National agenda for reform of university hospitals

Strategic level reforms are championed by the Supreme Council of Universities as the
main regulator of university hospitals. Recently, there are two national reforms in
relation to the educational system and to the organization of university hospitals. As a
member of the Supreme Council of Universities highlights:
"The Medical Sector Committee within the Supreme Council of Universities
confirms the application of the (5+2) educational system starting the
academic year 2018-2019. After the completion of these years, physicians who
seek specialization are mandated to fulfill five additional years in their area of
preference. The main proposition of this reform is to separate clinical
education from the academic professional track" (September 2017).
According to the recently ratified amendment of article no. 154 of Law no. 49/1972,
the enrollment duration for a bachelor degree is five years instead of six following the
credit hours system. These are followed by two more years of clinical training. The
change of the educational system automatically reflects on the structure of hospitals
because they have to cater for the new academic curriculum structure and the training
program structure.
Another national reform relates to a new law that organizes the work of university
hospitals. As explained in the institutional dimension, it is common to have hospitals
under direct administration of the university with no affiliation to the medical school.
The Governance Expert points this out during his interview stating,
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"The law attempts to move the hospitals under the direct administration of the
university to the administration of the faculty of medicine. This movement
implies more responsibility allocated to the dean as well as more authority"
(September 2017).
The new law has several implications on the institutional affiliation of hospitals,
medical centers, research institutes that were previously linked to the university (not
to the faculty of medicine) are moved under the administration of the medical school
and follow the same mandates of the affiliate hospitals to the medical school. This
reform is an important one because it consolidates all hospitals and research centers
under the overarching umbrella of the medical school. This automatically leads to
better aligned efforts and minimizes duplications.
Another important reform mandated in the new law about the creation of a Supreme
Council for University Hospitals. In this regard, the Member of Supreme Council of
Universities explains:
"The main purpose of the inception of this Council is to put overarching
policies to guide and coordinate the work of university hospitals across Egypt,
to recommend technical, financial and administrative bylaws of university
hospitals to be ratified by the Minister of Higher Education, to give
consultative opinion on the institutional performance of university hospitals,
to identify general guidelines of service provision and to cooperate with the
Ministry of Health and the Directorates of Health in the governorates in that
regard, to articulate systems for performance enhancement in university
hospitals, and to give consultative opinions on matters of the Council
presented by the Minister of Higher Education or by universities" (September
2017).
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The scope of work of the Supreme Council for University Hospitals enables the
coordination of activities across all university hospitals in Egypt. Moreover, the topics
discussed in this Council are independent from influences and discussions of other
faculty matters in the university, which usually takes place in the SCU. The idea is to
create a specialized type of council that allows for knowledge sharing between
university hospitals across Egypt.
On the level of hospital governance, the new law mandates the creation of a board of
trustees for all hospitals in each university that encompasses top leadership from all
healthcare related faculties through a decree by the university president. The main
proposition of this new structural layer within the governance structure of university
hospitals enables the collaboration between all healthcare related disciplines and for
better interdisciplinary integration.
Moreover, the new organizing law to university hospitals indicates a different
composition of the board of directors.
"There is a clear consideration to shrink the size of the board of directors.
Similar to the existing board structure, the chairman of the board is the medical
school dean. The other members include:


chief executive manager of all affiliate hospitals



all hospital managers of all affiliate hospitals



five members specialized in healthcare affairs nominated by the chief
executive manager and to be appointed through a decree by the university
president

The main responsibilities of the board is to coordinate the efforts between all
affiliate hospitals, to coordinate between the academic departments within the
faculty and the hospitals, to monitor the performance of all hospitals, to organize
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the educational and research purposes for students within hospitals, and finally
to report periodically to the university president" (Member of Supreme Council
of Universities, September, 2017).
The new law attempts to diminish clearly diminishes the number of members serving
on the board. In addition, the type of members on the board of directors is dominantly
of executive nature. Once this new law is ratified, the existing Law no. 3300/1965 is
invalid. However, same issue with the board composition is noticeable here as well.
The executive versus non-executive representation is relatively high which would
reflect on the board discussions.
5.3.2 Localized organization level for reform
Reforms that take place within the hospital premises are mostly of operational nature
rather than structural. Hospitals indulge in reforms that relate to enhancing their
performance and their capacity. These are explained by one of the university hospital
managers. He states:
"Typical examples of these reforms are upgrade of infrastructure, trainings to
the medical staff and inception of educational programs for students, capacity
building to administrative staff for computer usage and soft skills, enhancing
the quality of medical services through infection control programs, and giving
trainings to the medical staff on emergency cases" (University Hospital
Manager 1, August 2017).
The reforms of the hospital include mainly infrastructure upgrade and soft skills
training to physicians. These reforms follow more an input focused strategy that
accentuates the expansion in inputs like equipment, beds, human resources etc.
(Harding and Preker, 2000). In alignment with the statement of the University
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Hospital Manager, the Senior Specialist gives a similar picture of the reforms
undertaken in another university hospital he works at. He states:
"Reforms that take place at our university hospital are dominantly manifested
in the upgrade of infrastructure and enhancing the operational efficiency of
the hospital, and the recruitment of academic staff members" (Senior
Specialist, August 2017).
One can infer that the main reforms championed by the hospital leadership are input
focused. It underscores the necessity for input in the hospital premises to ameliorate
the operational flow and enhance the capacity. As highlighted by University Hospital
Manager 1:
"As a hospital manager I am entangled in daily contengencies on the
operational level. My main concern is to enhance the processes and
organizational outcomes for day to day activities. Governance and structural
changes are important aspects to consider but I have the obligation of patients
to treat with or without structural changes" (August 2017).
It is clear that hospital leadership is involved in putting out fires on daily basis leaving
no space for championing any structural reforms. Patient treatment and ameliorating
the patient flow within the hospital premises are the main driving forces to the
hospital leadership. In addition, University Hospital Manager 2 highlights the same
idea as the first hospital manager. She states:
"In a situation where I have serious problems with the transfer of patients
within the hospital because of no functioning elevators, I cannot think of any
structural advancements but to solve the undue bottle necks in the hospital
flow" (University Hospital Manager 2, September 2017).
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The operational processes and contingency situations absorb hospital leadership
making it a priority to solve these issues. In accordance, there is no space left for any
prospective thinking to hospital managers.
5.3.3

Key considerations of the reform

First, the alignment of all affiliate hospitals under the overarching umbrella of
the medical school minimizes duplications. As described, there are hospitals and
research institutes that do not relate to the board of directors of hospitals. They are
directly affiliated to the university. The merging of these hospitals under the board of
hospitals is a step towards consolidating the efforts and minimizing duplications.
Second, changing the educational system reflects on composition of the hospitals
to fit in the new educational curriculum. The unified governance model implies
that the change in one mission reflects on the other. The change of the educational
system reflects on the clinical practices in the hospital and the structure of the training
programs for physicians.
Third, reform of boards of directors of hospitals still has issues in its composition.
Although the currently discussed law is an important reform for downsizing the size
of the board, the composition of the board is still problematic. The presence of a
relatively large number of executives on the board will reflect on the strategic role of
the board.
Fourth, input focused strategies are the guiding reforms on the hospital level. As
hospital leadership is entangled in a lot of firefighting and solving contingencies in
the hospital, they are left with limited room for any strategic level advancement.
Fifth, the reforms still do not tackle the core issue with the 'stratified
centralization'. Despite all the reforms that tackle inherent issues in the system of
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university hospitals, they still do no target one of the main hampering factors to their
work; centralization.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations
6.1. Concluding Remarks
The study attempts to explore the governance arrangement of publicly-owned
university hospitals. The central proposition for studying the institutional governance
arrangement of public university hospitals is that it is considered one of the important
enablers to achieve their tripartite missions effectively. Of all the potential factors that
contribute to the achievement of the missions, the study takes institutional governance
as the root cause of the inability of university hospitals to meet their missions
effectively. In accordance, the aim of this work is to identify the governance
arrangement of public university hospitals in Egypt, the challenges that face these
hospitals based on the current governance arrangement as well as potential ways to
overcome the identified challenges, and the nature of current reforms taking place
concerning university hospitals.
The significance of this work lays in the description of the system that governs
university hospitals and the potential challenges that arise from the current structure,
and the current reforms undertaken. This description underscores areas of
improvement for better performing public university hospitals. Through deploying a
qualitative research design and creating a framework for exploring institutional
governance in public hospitals, in-depth interviews are carried out and review of
secondary data is conducted for triangulation purposes.
In reference to the research questions, this study illustrates the following
considerations regarding the institutional governance arrangement of university
hospitals.


From an institutional perspective, public university hospitals in Egypt follow
the unified governance model where the university presides over the medical
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school, academic plans, and the clinical functions. The ultimate authority is
manifested in the university president representing the ownership interest. The
university president appoints the dean who is responsible for the medical
school and for the hospitals. He/she is also the chairman of the board of
directors of hospitals. The dean unifies the academic and the clinical functions
under his/her occupational capacity. In the Egyptian context, the unified
governance reveals a number of advantages that include: (a) alignment of the
academic plan with the practical training in hospitals and (b) smoother
agreements between the medical school and the hospitals as they are both
represented in the dean.


From an accountability perspective, the board of directors' composition and
size do not enable it to perform its oversight and supervisory functions over
affiliate university hospitals. Based on an outdated decree that governs the
work of university hospitals, the actual size of the boards of directors is
relatively large. The composition of the board encompasses a wide range of
stakeholders, however, the proportion of executive versus non-executive
directors is high and high representation of academic staff. In accordance,
board discussions tend to be operational rather than strategic and focused on
individual academic department matters. Moreover, limited information flow
does not enable the board to exercise its oversight function and develop
strategic plans.



From a financial perspective, the diverse financial streams of university
hospitals are not properly consolidated in an electronic system. This results in
a highly fragmented system.
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From a hospital leadership decision making capacity perspective, it is evident
that hospital managers are not adequately empowered in alignment with the
responsibilities assigned to them. Throughout the study, clear manifestation of
lacking clinical, financial and administrative decision making capacities are
demonstrated.



From an operational perspective, there is potential imbalance in the
coordination of the missions where academic functions encroach on clinical
ones and vice versa. Educational functions can hamper the efficiency of
clinical practices in the hospital. In accordance, academic missions can
undermine clinical practices. Also, patient treatment exhausts the budget of
other academic activities because there is high demand on services from
university hospitals.



From a reform perspective, the new law currently discussed proposes a
smaller size for the hospital boards of directors. However, the composition of
the board is still problematic. The presence of a relatively large number of
executives on the board will reflect on the strategic role of the board.
Most importantly, current reforms do not tackle one of the greatest hampering
factors to the work of university hospitals which is the 'stratified centralization'
across their organizational hierarchy.

6.2. Recommendations
Based on the analysis of university hospitals and the corresponding challenges that
they face, there are a considerable number of areas of improvement in their
governance arrangement. The following are some advisable improvements from both
a public administrative reform paradigm and from an overarching public policy
paradigm.

| P a g e 112

Recommendations from a public administration perspective:
Institutional enhancements:


The study reveals that the unified governance arrangement is a favorable
arrangement, which implies that reforms directed towards any separation between
the medical school and the hospitals are not favorable. Improvement efforts
should mainly be directed towards aligning responsibilities and roles between
actors within this unified arrangement.



In alignment with the ongoing discussions on the consolidation of all affiliate
hospitals to the university under one umbrella of the board of directors to all
hospitals, this is a positive step towards removing redundancies in clinical
practices. Having all hospitals under the authority of the board of directors will
automatically result in better alignment not only in clinical practices but also in
academic and research efforts.



More procedural autonomy needs to be given to the hospital manager, the general
manager of hospitals and the dean for better decision making processes. This will
result in efficiency in the decision making dynamics at the different levels of
university hospitals. In accordance, the relationship between these three actors
should move towards oversight adequate to the level of autonomy these actors
have rather than a relationship with direct interventions and ratifications.



The study shows that the situation of the units with special purpose is problematic.
It is advisable to link these units under the authority of the hospital manager as it
is located within the hospital he/she manages. This automatically implies that the
units will be affiliated to the general manager of hospitals rather than the Vice
Dean for Environmental Affairs and Community Service.

Accountability enhancements:
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The board of directors needs to be strengthened through professional development
in term of composition and size. The size of the board should be an enabling
factor for constructive discussions that enhances the performance of affiliate
hospitals. Relying only on stakeholder representation on the board is not
advisable. The diversity in the composition with a balanced representation of
executive, non-executive, academic staff, clinical professionals, and independent
directors ensures the existence of all necessary experiences for better planning. In
addition, introducing independent board members would guarantee the inclusion
of important expertise to the work of university hospitals.



For members who serve on the board, they need to be given a professional
training on the role of boards and the adequate practices of boards in university
hospital settings for proper oversight and strategic planning.



For better accountability, information availability and accessibility are key
domains for well-informed actors of the hospital management and ultimately to
the board of directors. Also, the dissemination of strategic information is a vital
element to hold actors accountable to their performance based on accurate
information.

Hospital management decision making enhancements:


The adequate empowerment to hospital manager in alignment with the clinical,
financial and administrative responsibilities that they carry is a fundamental pillar
for well-governed university hospitals.



Relationship dynamics between the hospital management and the department
heads needs to be formalized in a way that allows hospital managers to hold the
department heads accountable to the performance of their clinical practices.
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Auxiliary department representatives within the hospital premises have to report
to the hospital manager not only to their central department. This will ensure that
the hospital manager is well-informed about all aspects of the hospital for better
quality of decisions.

Financial system enhancements:


Incorporating an electronic financial system connecting all financial streams is a
key element for a comprehensive overview of all financials. This will enhance the
financial transparency and solve the issue of unrecorded financials.



Proper financial performance indicators have to be incorporated within the
financial system of university hospitals linked to the tripartite mission of
university hospitals. Being held accountable by governmental control authorities
for no fraud or corruption within the hospital does necessarily imply proper
financial performance.

Recommendations from a public policy perspective:
The aforementioned public administration interventions need to be supported with
national policies that promote proper institutional governance in all government
institutions. Institutional governance reforms of public university hospitals can be the
entry point to incorporate proper governance arrangements in national policies. It can
be seen as a paradigm shift in public service delivery and the creation of public value
not only in healthcare but also in other sectors. The principles of proper institutional
governance are not confined to public university hospitals but are generalizable to
other public service delivery institutions. The inception of a policy that encourages
the reengineering of governing structures of public institutions will result in more
institutional empowerment for better performance.
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